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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT
THOMAS
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The Supreme Court's doctrine of stare decisis has been a
consistent target of cynical criticism. Unfortunately, the Court's
own articulationof its doctrine often fuels the fire. In this Article,
Professor Lee builds on the economic justifications offered in
support of a general rule of stare decisis to develop an economic
model to measure the various strands of the Court's doctrine. The
model consists of a social loss function composed of three kinds of
costs: litigationcosts, adjustment costs, and errorcosts. Professor
Lee hypothesizes that the various strands of the Court's doctrine
may be understood as attempts to minimize the sum of the above
costs. After developing the intuition behind the economic model,
the Article applies the model to explain a number of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions overruling precedent. By translatingthe
Court's rhetoric in those cases into economic terms, the Article
offers an objective yardstick for evaluating doctrinal principles
that have heretofore lacked a systematicframework for analysis.
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"If stare decisis be one aspect of law, as it is, to disregard it in
identic situations is mere caprice." 1
INTRODUCTION

Justice Felix Frankfurter's observation on the Supreme Court's
doctrine of precedent provides the framework for an important
question: is stare decisis an "aspect of law" capable of reasoned
application, or is it merely a "capricious" exercise of raw power? The
accepted view to date among Supreme Court watchers has been the
cynical one. Indeed, commentators variously condemn the Court's
doctrine of precedent as a "backwater of the law," 2 "a mask hiding
1. United States v. International Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 249 (1955)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Justice William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, Address
Before the Bar of the City of New York (Apr. 12, 1949), in 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736
(1949) (asserting that "[s]tare decisis serves to take the capricious element out of law").
2. Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in JudicialDecisions, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 422, 422 (1988). Despite this and other epithets, Judge Easterbrook concludes
that the absence of a "principled theory" of stare decisis is a necessary evil. Id. at 422, 423
(asserting that we "never can have[' a comprehensive theory of precedent, any more than
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other considerations, '

particular

outcome,"4

3

"a hoax designed to provide cover for a

and a matter of "convenience to both

conservatives and liberals," whose "friends ...are determined by the

needs of the moment."'5 Conventional wisdom, in other words, has
assumed that the Court's doctrine of stare decisis is not an "aspect of
law" but is merely a formulaic litany of opposing factors used to
"thrust" and "parry" depending on the individual Justice's views on
the merits of the case.

Unfortunately, the Court's own articulation of its doctrine fuels
the fire of cynical criticism. For instance, while some Supreme Court
opinions suggest that stare decisis cannot require blind adherence to
plainly erroneous decisions, others assert that mere error is an

we can have a complete theory of the 'just price' of wheat, or of when to spend more time
studying the attributes of securities").
3. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM.
L. REV.723,743 (1988).
4. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of
ConstitutionalInterpretation: Some Modest Proposalsfrom the Twenty-Third Century, 59
ALB. L. REV. 671, 681 (1995).
5. Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional
Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1988); see also College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2232 (1999) (chiding the
dissent for using stare decisis "as a weapon rather than a guide"); Michael J. Gerhardt,
The Role of Precedent in ConstitutionalDecisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 68, 72 (1991) (noting that "conservatives criticize the Warren Court's disregard for
precedents, but not the Rehnquist Court's assault on liberal precedents," while "liberals
denounce the Rehnquist Court's attacks on their icons, but not the Warren and Burger
Courts' overrulings of conservative precedents" (footnotes omitted)). For a discussion
and historical response to these and other criticisms, see generally Thomas R. Lee, Stare
Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52
VAND. L. REV. 647, 648 (1999) (discussing historical responses to stare decisis).
6. The "thrust" and "parry" construct borrows from Professor Llewellyn's famous
article criticizing the various canons of statutory construction on this same basis. See Karl
N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). For a
response to Llewellyn, see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpretingthe Constitution and Laws, in
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 27 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) ("Mostly, ... Llewellyn's 'Parries' do not contradict the
corresponding canon but rather merely show that it is not absolute."). Economic analysis
helps to provide a defense of the Court's doctrine of stare decisis that is analogous to
Justice Scalia's defense of the statutory canons. On the surface, the Court's overruling
rhetoric is often inconsistent, but the apparent contradictions can be understood largely as
necessary limitations on principles that are limited in their scope and application. For
example, assumptions about expected costs ordinarily may dictate retention of erroneous
precedent. Nevertheless, in special cases those assumptions may break down, and
understandably the general rule may give way to an exception which is easily justifiable in
economic terms.
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insufficient basis for reversal of course.7 When some Justices hold
that a precedent "undermined" by subsequent authority or deemed
"unworkable" in practice is vulnerable to reversal,8 dissenters rejoin
that the degree of deterioration or unworkability merely reflects the
majority's views on the merits of the issue. 9 Finally, while the Court
now seems settled on the notion that constitutional precedent
deserves less deference than its statutory counterpart, for more than a
century the constitutional or statutory nature of a decision had no
effect on the Court's willingness to overrule itself.10 Moreover, none
of these strands of the Court's doctrine of precedent has any clearly
articulated theoretical basis. No jurist or scholar has offered a
yardstick of theory or logic to identify when error may be a sufficient
basis for reversal or when a decision is sufficiently undermined or
unworkable to justify setting it aside.
This Article proposes that the cynical response to the Court's
principles of precedent is not a necessary one. It seeks to take the
doctrine seriously as an "aspect of law" and to do so with the tools of
economic analysis. To date, economic commentary has offered some
important background insights on the costs and benefits of a system
of precedent, 1 but the existing literature primarily has focused on
identification of the economic functions generally associated with a
system of precedent. None of the commentary has attempted to use
economic analysis to explain specific strands of the doctrine of stare
decisis articulated by the Supreme Court. This Article takes up that
challenge.
Part I begins by examining and building on the economic
justifications offered in support of a general rule of stare decisis. The
resulting economic model identifies the costs and benefits of abiding
by past decisions and hypothesizes that the Court's overruling
rhetoric can be understood to sanction departure from stare decisis
only when the benefits of such a move outweigh its costs. Subsequent
Parts use the economic model to explain the complex and sometimes
conflicting strands of the modem Supreme Court's doctrine of
precedent. Part II analyzes the apparent conflict in the Court's
7. See infra Part II.
8. This Article uses the terms "overrule," "overturn," and "reverse" synonymously.
9. See infra Parts III and IV.
10. See Lee, supra note 5, at 703-33.
11. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976);
Jonathan R. Macey, The Internaland External Costs andBenefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CH.KENT L. REV. 93 (1989).
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rhetoric describing its power to overturn precedent based on a
current perception of error. Parts III and IV take up the Rehnquist
Court's frequent suggestion that "unworkable" or "undermined"
authority is particularly susceptible to reversal. Finally, Part V
considers the modem dichotomy that allocates deference based on
the statutory or constitutional nature of the precedent. In each Part,

the economic model explains the doctrine espoused by the Court and
adds some structure to its sometimes empty overruling rhetoric.
I. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF PRECEDENT

Judge Easterbrook has lamented the startling absence of any
"consistent theory" of stare decisis:
Few Justices hint at a theory of precedent; no Justice has
produced a consistent theory; although the academy is
awash with competing theories of substantive law, there is
no contest in the theory of stare decisis. Not because one
candidate has swept the boards, but because no one has a
principled theory to offer. 2
Despite the initial warning that "it should frighten us that we do not
have a theory" of precedent, however, Judge Easterbrook eventually
gives in to the conclusion that a "comprehensive theory" is
impossible. 3
In a sense, Easterbrook is right. Any decision whether to retain
or discard a precedent raises diverse policy considerations that are
frequently at odds with each other and are likely to change over time.
As explained in detail below, the decision to retain a precedent may
give rise to certain costs associated with perpetuating a legal error,
while a decision to discard it may result in increased adjustment and
litigation costs. Because the magnitude of these cost considerations
inevitably will vary with the nature of the precedent and the parties,
the questions of whether and when precedent should be retained
afford no universal answer. Thus, as Easterbrook notes, "we do not
have-never can have-a comprehensive theory of precedent, any
more than we can have a complete theory of the 'just price' of wheat,
or of when to spend more time studying the attributes of securities."' 4
The difficulty (impossibility?) of determining a universal
optimum for precedent, however, should hardly foreclose further
analysis. To the contrary, a closer look at the specific cost factors that
12. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 422.
13. Id. at 423.
14. 1
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may affect the advisability of retaining precedent in any particular
case is in order. By cataloging the various cost factors involved in a
decision whether to follow precedent, this Article offers a positive
economic analysis 5 of the Supreme Court's doctrine of stare decisis.
The resulting "theory" is one of cost-minimization. Specifically,
the hypothesis is that the complex and apparently conflicting rules
dictating when to set aside precedent may be understood as attempts
to minimize a social loss function composed of various public and
private costs. Admittedly, the theory fails to offer the untenable-a
concrete rule for divining an optimum point of precedent in any
particular case. But this Article does reach beyond the existing
literature in offering a comprehensive methodology for
understanding the sometimes empty rhetoric used by the Supreme
Court.
A.

Cost-SavingFunctions of Stare Decisis
Adherence to precedent performs a number of important costsaving functions. For one thing, stare decisis conserves public and
private litigation expenses. One oft-cited iteration of the public costsaving function was offered by Justice (then-Judge) Cardozo, who
stated that "[tihe labor of judges would be increased almost to the
breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case,
and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure
16
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.'
Under this formulation, a general rule of adherence to precedent
purportedly "expedites the work of the courts by preventing the
constant reconsideration of settled questions."' 7
15. Although the Article's methodology is largely positive, it ventures into the
normative in Part V in comparing the modem Court's dichotomy between constitutional
and statutory precedent to the historical approach that prevailed prior to the 1920s. The
history of the Court's differential treatment of constitutional and statutory precedent is
outlined in detail in Lee, supra note 5, at 703-33.
16. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921),

quoted in Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 711 (1995) (plurality opinion);
Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 105 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 644 n.4 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
17. Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV.
409, 410 (1924); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 125 (1995) (noting
that "if judges considered every case afresh they would, if conscientious, have to work
harder" but also acknowledging the countervailing consideration that "following
precedent requires research"); id, at 142 (asserting that the proposition that
"abandonment or erosion of stare decisis increase[s] work loads" is "plausible although
not certain"); Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 423 (asserting that "[p]recedent decentralizes
decisionmaking" and "economizes on information"); Macey, supra note 11, at 102 (noting
that stare decisis enables judges "to avoid having to rethink the merits of particular legal
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Justice Cardozo's efficiency argument seems best suited to
justifying a system of "vertical" stare decisis, under which lower

courts are bound by decisions of higher ones.

Absent a rule of

deference to higher authority, the judiciary's workload would become
almost unbearable.' 8 Lower courts could hardly go about the business
of applying the rules and standards applicable to the factually
complex cases before them if the governing principles of law were

always open to reconsideration. In this sense, stare decisis facilitates
the conservation of "adjudicative resources" at the lower-court level
by permitting courts to "resolve more cases" than they could without

such a rule.'
But this Article focuses on the "horizontal" dimension of stare

decisis, which concerns the extent to which the Supreme Court
considers itself bound by its own decisions.

At this level, Justice

Cardozo's formulation of the public cost-saving functions of a system
of precedent appears to lose much of its punch. To be sure, a system
that required reconsideration of Supreme Court precedent in any

case that could call it into question would be extraordinarily costly;
but a system of mandatory reconsideration is scarcely a reasonable
baseline of comparison?2
Instead, the proper point of comparison is to a standard that

would more liberally permit the Court to reconsider its past decisions
whenever there are five votes for reversal. Does the current system

perform any significant public cost-saving functions in comparison to
such a discretionary regime? At one level, the cost savings appear to
be insignificant. The modern Court has almost complete discretion
doctrine" in many cases).
18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
19. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspectiveon Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 63, 77 (1989); see also Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the
Evolution of Legal Precedentand Rules, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 229 (1986) (asserting that
"precedents make it easier (or less costly) for judges to decide because ....
they can rely
on earlier analysis in the form of a stock of already accumulated experience from past
cases"); Macey, supra note 11, at 111 (asserting that stare decisis "allows judges to
maximize leisure time" by "free-rid[ing] on the earlier efforts of other judges"). Other
economic analyses of stare decisis similarly focus their attention on arguments aimed at a
requirement of vertical deference to precedent and have little or no application to the
horizontal question that is the focus of this Article. Macey, for example, suggests that
"stare decisis enables higher courts to select cases for review more efficiently" because
"cases that depart dramatically from established precedent can be easily identified and
singled out for special attention." Macey, supra note 11, at 108.
20. No one would advocate a requirement that the Court reconsider all of its
precedents in any case in which they are relevant, "right down to a daly reconsideration of
the very foundations of judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison." Lee, supra
note 5,at 654.

650

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

over the volume and content of its docket.2' In this regime, a rule that
limits the Court's discretion to reverse itself arguably performs no
significant cost-saving function. When the Court itself decides which
cases merit the investment of its limited resources, the claim that stare

decisis permits the Court to "resolve more cases" seems weak.
Indeed, a doctrine that creates barriers to self-reversal arguably
demands a greater investment in judicial resources, in that such a
doctrine requires the Court to navigate and develop a now-complex
web of impediments to changes in precedent and injects the Court
into artificial attempts to distinguish existing authority instead of
forthrightly overruling it. 2
On another level, however, a rule of horizontal stare decisis
surely does perform an adjudicative cost-saving function. A system
that enhances the stability of the Court's body of precedent
discourages expenditures on litigation aimed at disrupting it.
Conversely, a more highly discretionary regime would signal a greater
receptiveness to arguments directed at overruling precedent, thus
encouraging increased expenditures directed at overruling previous
decisions z' More fundamentally, rules of stare decisis enhance the
level of stability and certainty in the law, thereby decreasing the
incentive for litigation at all levels of the judicial system. The notion
that uncertainty promotes litigation is hardly a new one.24 The insight
offered here is simply that a rule of stare decisis increases certainty

21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994); see also Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The
Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 94-98 (1989)
(discussing the changes enacted by the Supreme Court Case Selections Act, Pub. L. No.
100-352, §§ 2(a)-(b), 3-4, 102 Stat. 662, 662-63 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254-1258
(1994)), which allows the Supreme Court to exercise almost complete discretion over its
docket).
22. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 125.
23. The effects of the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), which many perceived as a signal of the Court's willingness
to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), are at least anecdotal evidence of this point.
One commentator estimated that "[m]agazine and news stories on abortion tripled from
1988 to 1989 (the year Webster was decided)," that "more than 350 anti-abortion bills were
introduced in 43 state legislatures" in the year following the decision, and that "[t]his
flurry of activity" continued for several years. Neal Devins, JudicialMatters, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 1027, 1062-63 (1992) (reviewing GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOcIAL CHANGE? (1991)); see also Anne Kornhauser,
Abortion Case Has Been Boon to Both Sides: With New Membership and Funding,Rivals
Girdfor Next Round, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), July 3, 1989, at 1 (noting the increased
activity by pro- and anti-abortion groups alike in the wake of Webster).
24. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 610, 611 (5th ed. 1998);
Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55,63-64 (1982).
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and thus reduces the incentive for litigationl
Stare decisis also conserves litigation costs in another way.
Initially, adopting a new legal rule may spawn litigation aimed at
testing the contours of the rule and at refining its scope. If such
refinement litigation eventually tapers off as the contours of the rule

develop, then the costs of such litigation would be a sunk cost of an
existing precedent and would be incurred only in the event of the

adoption of a new rule. Accordingly, the costs associated with
litigation aimed at refining a new rule also must be counted as a
marginal cost of a departure from stare decisis.
The cost savings associated with a system of stare decisis extend
beyond those incurred in litigation. Increased certainty not only
discourages litigation; it also enables more efficient planning in
reliance on precedent. 26 Again, compare the effects of the current

system of stare decisis, which establishes some barriers to self-reversal
by the Supreme Court, to a more freely discretionary regime. The
current system reduces the degree of upheaval in the Court's body of

precedent, thus enabling "the political branches and the people"

more efficiently to "plan against the background of known rules."'27

A more discretionary system, by comparison, would make planning
and reliance more costly and less efficient.
25. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 11, at 265 ("According to the economic analysis
of the settlement of legal disputes out of court, an increase in the predictability of the
outcome of litigation should result in an increase in the settlement rate[,] ...[which]
should reduce the total costs of legal dispute resolution." (citations omitted)); Macey,
supra note 11, at 107 (arguing that a system of stare decisis "maximize[s] the public-good
attributes of precedent by lowering the uncertainty that plagues the legal system," and
thus "permit[s] better planning by legal actors, and result[s] in less litigation").
26. See Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 78 (asserting that "[pilanning requires each
agent to formulate expectations about the future, including any future legal obligations,"
and that these expectations depend on a rule of stare decisis); Macey, supranote 11, at 107
(noting that the certainty advanced by stare decisis "permit[s] better planning by legal
actors"); Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in

Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67, 70 (1.988) (asserting that a
"doctrine of precedent" promotes efficient decisionmaking and "predictability in our
affairs"); see also RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 60-66 (1961)
(offering certainty as a major justification for stare decisis); Theodore M. Benditt, The
Rule of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 89, 91, 95 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987)
(offering a general overview of the doctrine of precedent).
27. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 430.
28. See Lawrence E. Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal
Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 408-10 (1982) (noting the choice between following
precedent and avoiding transition costs and disregarding precedent in order to keep pace
with changing circumstances). Some commentators have questioned the significance of
the costs of adjustment to precedent by suggesting that economic actors may be able to
protect themselves through market mechanisms, compare Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 543-50 (1986) (arguing that
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The adoption of a new legal regime by the Court may impinge on
institutional investments based on an abandoned precedent. When
the Court adopts a newly restrictive conception of governmental
power or a newly expansive conception of individual rights, it may
threaten institutions that are built around the presumed validity of
the current precedential regime.
Existing institutions, both
governmental and private, assume, for example, the validity of federal
criminal laws prohibiting drug possession and of certain state
restrictions on attorney advertising. Reversal of the precedents on
which these assumptions are built would give rise to substantial
29
adjustment costs as these institutions adjust to a new regime.
The literature notes a final cost-saving function of stare decisis
involving the avoidance of errors in the judicial system. Jonathan
Macey, for example, has argued that stare decisis "enables judges to
reduce the uncertainty associated with making decisions" by
permitting them to "check their results against the results reached by
similar judges. ' 30 From the "assumption that other judges usually are
correct when they reach legal decisions," Macey concludes that
"judges generally employ stare decisis because it enables them to
avoid having to rethink the merits of particular legal doctrine." 31
Judge Easterbrook reaches a similar conclusion, noting that a rule of
adherence to precedent "cuts down on idiosyncratic conclusions by
subjecting each judge's work to the test of congruence with the
conclusions of those confronting the same problem," and "increases
...the chance of the court's being right. ' 32 The idea here is that a
rule of stare decisis reduces not only litigation costs and adjustment
costs, but also error costs, which are the costs associated with an
erroneous judicial decision. Although error costs are an important
element of the economic model, the error-cost saving function would
investors can protect themselves against the risk of legal change through pricing,
diversification, and insurance), with Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An
EquilibriumApproach, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1056, 1090-91 (1997) (questioning the extent
to which market remedies are effective), or by asserting that efficiency favors encouraging
anticipation of legal change over deference to reliance, see Kaplow, supra, at 511.
29. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 28, at 418 (suggesting "that it may make sense
to change precedent slowly if the transition costs of change are high"); Kornhauser, supra

note 19, at 83 (defining adjustment costs as "costs that the agents incur when the court
changes the legal rule," which "might arise because, when the legal rule changes, an agent
may make a radical change in her behavior and such radical changes often require new
investments or other costly adaptations").
30. Macey, supra note 11, at 102.
31. Id.
32. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 423; see also Stone, supra note 26, at 70 (asserting
that stare decisis brings increased attention to the "stakes" of resolving a legal dispute).
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be fully advanced by a pennissive standard of stare decisis-one that

would accord unfettered discretion to the Court to reverse itself
whenever it sees fit. A permissive standard would fully enable
members of the Court to "check their results against the results

reached" by their predecessors, to "avoid having to rethink the merits
of particular legal doctrine," and thus to "increase the chance of the

court's being right." The current doctrine's limitations on the Court's
discretion to overrule

itself certainly perform litigation- and

adjustment-cost saving functions, but they do not seem to economize
on error costs? 3
33. In addition to the cost-saving functions outlined here, there are undoubtedly other
benefits that are less susceptible of reduction to an economic model. For instance, stare
decisis helps to preserve the integrity and legitimacy of the Supreme Court by minimizing
the appearance that the Court's construction of federal statutory and constitutional
provisions depends on its ideological make-up. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 26566 (1986) (noting that stare decisis "contributes to the integrity of our constitutional
system of government, both in appearance and in fact," by preserving the presumption
"that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals"); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (suggesting
that stare decisis preserves the perception of "the judiciary as a source of impersonal and
reasoned judgments"); Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in

Constitutional Law, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 467, 484 (noting that for the Court to function
effectively, the public must be willing to accept the Court in this role, and that "this
acceptance in turn depends on the public perception that in each case the majority of the
Court is speaking for the Constitution itself rather than simply for five or more lawyers in
black robes"). I have not attempted to capture this notion in my economic model, both
because it is difficult to objectify and reduce to a form that would lend itself to economic
analysis, and because it is often subject to a parallel, countervailing argument that the
Court's legitimacy is actually undermined by a rule that restricts its ability to correct itself.
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that "the
notion that an important constitutional decision with plainly inadequate rational support
must be left in place for the sole reason that it once attracted five votes" would undermine
the Court's legitimacy); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (" 'The jurist concerned with "[p]ublic confidence in, and acceptance off the
judicial system" might well consider that, ... a decision contrary to the public sense of
justice as it is, operates ... to diminish respect for the courts and for law itself.'" (quoting
Peter L. Szanton, Stare Decisis; A Dissenting View, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 394, 397 (1959)
(quoting Herber C. Kaufman, A Defense of Stare Decisis, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 288
(1959)) (alterations in original))); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (noting that frequent overrulings "tend[] to bring adjudications of this tribunal
into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only").
My model also ignores what might be called "deontologicaljustifications of stare
decisis"-justifications rooted in the theory that adjudicative consistency "has some
inherent moral value, without regard to the consequences of that practice." Christopher J.
Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality,Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE
LJ.2031, 2037 (1996); see also Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishingthe Justified,90 MICH.

L. REV. 2203, 2210 (1992) (defining "deontological" moral theories as theories that hold
"that the goodness of an act lies not in its consequences but in the inherent quality of the
act itself"); Peters, supra, at 2044 (distinguishing "consequentialist justifications" of stare
decisis from "deontological justifications" and arguing that the latter are illegitimate).
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B.

Costs of Stare Decisis
If anything, limitations on the Court's capacity to overrule itself
threaten to increase error costs. In comparison to a purely
discretionary regime, a system that limits the Court's freedom to alter
its precedent may insulate a clearly erroneous precedent from further
scrutiny and prevent its correction. This tendency must be counted as
the principal cost of any system of stare decisis. Thus, the
"assumption that other judges usually are correct when they reach
legal decisions"' is reasonable in most cases, but no one argues that
the Court is infallible. As Judge Easterbrook has noted, "[a]lthough
the system of precedent impounds information and wisdom greater
than any judge can bring to bear, no particular decision does so. A
given case may have been tossed off between sandwiches or based on
a factual blunder." 35
Moreover, the possibility of "error" in the Court's precedents
does not necessarily depend on a finding of a "blunder" by the Court
in the first instance. A misdirection in the Court's precedents may
stem from a failure by counsel to present a complete and accurate
record of relevant materials or, when relevant, from changes over
time in circumstances that were thought to have justified the Court's
initial decision.36
34. Macey, supranote 11, at 102.
35. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 423; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 82 (1990) (asserting that although "stare decisis may advance 'justice'
in a variety of senses, by making judicial decisions more acceptable to the lay public and
by reducing uncertainty," it also should be understood to "impede the search for truth").
Indeed, "stare decisis has the potential to import injustice irremediably into the law."
Peters, supra note 33, at 2033-34 (noting that the effects of a strict rule of stare decisis
"can be cumulative: A single erroneous court decision, if followed, becomes two
erroneous decisions, then three, and soon a 'line' of cases"). The error-cost effects of
many decisions may be avoided by the process of aggressively distinguishing precedent
that a judge finds troubling. See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results
of Rhetoric: JudicialWritings, 62 U. CaI. L. REV. 1371, 1400-01 (1995) (noting that a
judge intent on avoiding the implications of a precedent "will examine the facts and record
in the precedent and the instant case minutely to unveil critical differences between them"
and will consider "why applying the precedential policy in light of these fact disparities
would provoke disastrous and clearly unintended consequences for the parties and the
policy"). The propriety of this process, which undoubtedly is often "carried ... to a very
high pitch of ingenuity," Max Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 137, 143
(1946), has implications that overlap substantially with the discussion herein of the
theoretical basis for various strands of the Court's overruling rhetoric. Nevertheless, not
all precedents are distinguishable on their facts, and my focus here is on those
indistinguishable cases.
36. See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 28, at 409-10 (noting that "as economic,
technological, and social conditions change, existing legal rules may be less socially
desirable than other possible rules"); Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 423 (noting that
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For these reasons and others, cases arise in which the Court's

precedents will be in error and in which a strict rule of stare decisis
gives rise to certain costs that a purely discretionary regime would

avoid. Such "error costs" may take several forms. In the commonlaw arena-and, to a limited extent, in constitutional casescommentators have theorized that judicial precedent "evolves"

toward the adoption of efficient rules.37 If that premise is accepted,
stare decisis may stand in the way of the evolutionary process; it may
freeze in place an inefficient rule that a more efficient one would
otherwise replace.3 8 These inefficiencies are the most palpable forms

of "error costs" under the economic model.
In some cases, however, the "error" in a precedent may have
nothing to do with its substantive efficiency. Some constitutional
provisions are inefficient by design. 39 Judge Posner has asserted, for
example, that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination

advances no legitimate economic function.4" As for statutes, interest"[jiudges often decide cases on the basis of predictions about the effects of the legal rule"
and concluding that "[wle can examine these effects-both for other strands of doctrine
and for the world at large-and improve on the treatment of the earlier case"); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863-64 (1992) (plurality opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (suggesting that West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379
(1937), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), were "comprehensible as
the Court's response to facts that the country could understand, or had come to
understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day, ... had not been able to
perceive").
37. See, e.g., Martin J. Bailey & Paul H. Rubin, A Positive Theory of Legal Change, 14
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 467, 472-74 (1994); John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of
the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 394-95 (1978); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 259-84
(1979); Mark J.Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641, 641-43 (1996); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
51,51 (1977).
38. The doctrine of stare decisis is itself the product of common-law evolution over
the course of at least a couple of centuries. See Lee, supra note 5, at 659-66. Thus, the
premise of this Article-that stare decisis rules can be understood as rules of costminimization-is itself dependent on a theory that common-law rules "evolve" in such a
way as to produce economically efficient standards.
39. See Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 4, 15 (1987) (conceding that not "every provision of the Constitution is
efficiency enhancing"); cf. POSNER, supra note 24, at 676 (asserting that "[a]lthough the
U.S. Constitution is rightly venerated, we should not suppose it immune from the interestgroup pressures that beset the ordinary legislative process"). For a discussion of an
economic model of the constitutional amendment process under Article V, see generally
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDI-HAM L. REV. 111 passim
(1993).
40. See Posner, supranote 39, at 15 (asserting that "no economic reason has ever been
offered for why government should not be allowed to penalize a person who refuses to
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group dynamics suggest that legislation is aimed at the redistribution
of wealth and does not have any necessary correlation to what is
economically efficient. 4' In this context, a precedent may be in error
in the sense that it fails to implement the intent of the underlying
constitutional or statutory provision; yet the "error" itself may be
substantively more efficient than the alternative. Under such
circumstances, the "error costs" associated with the precedent in
question are much more elusive. They are simply the "costs"
associated with the Court's failure to implement the intent of the
controlling legal document. 42
Error costs also may encompass certain transaction costs
associated with extra-judicial efforts to overturn erroneous precedent.
To the extent that rules of stare decisis threaten to enshrine a decision
that is erroneous in substance or in its failure to implement the intent
of the controlling legal document, legal actors will seek other
methods of correction, either by private contracts that seek to avoid
the effects of the law43 or by efforts to amend statutes or the
Constitution. 44 In either event, purely discretionary rules of
precedent could mitigate the transaction costs associated with such
give testimony, merely because the testimony might show that the person has committed a
crime").
41. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 569 (asserting broadly that "[a]lthough the
correlation is far from perfect, judge-made rules tend to be efficiency-promoting while
those made by legislatures tend to be efficiency-reducing"); Todd Zywicki, A UnanimityReinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of
Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large Number Externality Problems, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV.961, 1015 (1996) (asserting that "[t]he empirical evidence supporting the
view that much legislation is passed to favor special interests at the expense of the public
at large is overwhelming"); cf Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 205, 207-11 (1982) (recognizing the inefficiency of legislation as compared
to judicial decisions but also asserting that scholars have failed to recognize certain
similarities between the processes that produce the two types of law).
42. For a lively debate on the appropriate methodology of divining the meaning of a
statutory provision, compare Scalia, supra note 6, at 3-47 (articulating the "textualist"
approach to statutory interpretation), with William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The
Unknown Ideal?, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 1509 passim (1998) (reviewing A MATrER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 6, and critiquing Justice
Scalia's textualist approach); see also Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits
of JudicialCompetence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833,
1838 (1998) (questioning the judiciary's competence to draw intentionalist inferences from
legislative history).
43. See Macey, supra note 11, at 109; see also Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 11, at 278
(asserting that "the effect of imprecision in deterring socially valuable activity" will be less
when transaction costs are low). A corollary of this point is that error costs may be more
significant when transaction costs are high. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text
(discussing the rules of property).
44. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 423.
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attempts at extra-judicial "correction." So long as the expected cost
of convincing a majority of the nine Justices of the Supreme Court
remains less than the expected cost of securing passage of a statute or
of a constitutional amendment, extra-judicial transaction costs add to
the error costs associated with a system of stare decisis.
The above error costs are the principal barrier to an ironclad
requirement of stare decisis. In the absence of significant error costs,
the cost savings cataloged above clearly point toward adherence to
precedent as the efficient outcome. When such error costs are at
stake, economic analysis suggests that the optimal outcome will
depend on the relative magnitude of the litigation-cost, adjustmentcost, and error-cost effects of the decision whether to retain the
precedent in question.
C. Stare Decisis and the Social Loss Function
With the above background, it may prove useful to summarize
the various cost considerations relevant to a system of stare decisis
through the articulation of a formal loss function. The loss function L
may be expressed as the sum of the three types of expected costs
discussed above, namely expected litigation costs, LC, expected
adjustment costs, AC, and expected error costs, EC:
L=LC+AC+EC
As noted above,4 5 LC is a function of the quantity of litigation,
which in turn is a function of the degree of uncertainty in the
Supreme Court's precedents. Thus, a decision to abandon precedent
can be expected to increase uncertainty, which in turn increases the
quantity of litigation as well as expected litigation costs. AC also is
expected to increase as a result of a decision to overrule a precedent.
Generally, when the Court abandons one of its decisions, private and
public actors will be forced to incur additional costs in response to the
replacement precedent. Increases in LC and AC are the principal
costs associated with a decision to abandon precedent; conversely,
adherence to precedent produces cost savings in the form of LC and
AC. EC, on the other hand, represents the primary cost of following
precedent. EC may encompass the cost associated with retaining a
substantively inefficient rule, the cost of failing to implement the
intent of the controlling legal document, and the transaction costs
45. See supra Section A.
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associated with extra-judicial attempts to overturn an erroneous
decision.

The hypothesis of this Article is that the Supreme Court's
doctrine of stare decisis may be explained as an effort to minimize
this loss function. Specifically, the economic model suggests that the
Court should follow precedent when the savings in litigation costs and
adjustment costs expected to flow from such a move outweigh the
expected error costs associated with the precedent. In terms of the
above loss function, where X represents the decision to overturn a
precedent and Y represents the decision not to overturn it, the costminimizing solution is to choose X (overturn precedent) if and only if:
EC(Y) > AC(X) + LC(X)

The balance of this Article evaluates this hypothesis by
examining various strands of the Court's doctrine of precedent and
testing them against the loss function. For the most part, the Article
concludes that the Court's standards further the cost-minimization
goal set forth above. In other words, the Court generally recognizes
exceptions to the rule of stare decisis only when the expected error
costs associated with keeping a precedent outweigh the litigation and
adjustment costs expected to result from overruling that precedent.
Admittedly, the cost elements of the loss function do not lend
themselves to precise, objective measurement, and the loss function
does not purport to answer the call for a theory that precisely
identifies the optimum point of precedent in every case.
Nevertheless, the loss function is a valuable tool; it adds some
structure to an area of the law that otherwise appears to many as
doctrinal "cover" for an issue that is dominated by unprincipled
variations on the degree of deference paid to precedent.46 By
translating the malleable and apparently empty rhetoric of the
current doctrine into economic-cost terms, the economic model
provides an opportunity to move the stare decisis discussion beyond
its current level of cynicism and toward a debate about concrete cost
considerations.
II. ECONOMICS AND "ERROR" IN PRECEDENT
The most basic question that any system of precedent must

46. See Cooper, supra note 5, at 402; Gerhardt, supra note 5, at 72; Monaghan, supra

note 3, at 743.
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answer is whether a prior decision is entitled to deference when it is
later thought to be in error.47 Despite the fundamental nature of this
question, the Court's jurisprudence is in substantial disarray as to the

effect of a perceived error in precedent. On one hand, the Court has
indicated that stare decisis cannot compel senseless compliance with
plainly erroneous decisions. Justice Scalia, for one, has flatly rejected
"the notion that an important constitutional decision with plainly
inadequate rational support must be left in place for the sole reason
that it once attracted five votes." Other members of the Court have
offered variations on this theme. In several cases, Justice Stevens has
approvingly quoted Justice Cardozo for a standard that purportedly
would enable the Court to overrule prior decisions on the basis of
their inconsistency with the current Justices' " ' "sense of justice,"
the "'"social welfare,"'" or the "' "mores of their day."' 49
Elsewhere, Justice Stevens has suggested that the error-correction bar
is substantially higher-that the Court's precedents should be set
aside only if deemed "egregiously incorrect."50 Finally, Justice
47. The introductory discussion here borrows from Lee, supranote 5, at 654.
48. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,834 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
49. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 645 n.4 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 16, at 150, 152)). This same standard appears
in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 174 (1989). In Patterson,the Court revisited its decision in Runyon, in which it had
held that the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), forbids racial discrimination in
private contracts. The Patterson Court refused to overrule Runyon, noting that "it has
sometimes been said that a precedent becomes more vulnerable as it becomes outdated
and after being' "tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of
justice or with the social welfare ....Patterson,491 U.S. at 174 (quoting Runyon, 427 U.S.
at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 16, at 150)). The Patterson
Court, however, found Runyon to be "not inconsistent with the prevailing sense of justice
in this country" and "entirely consistent with our society's deep commitment to the
eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or the color of his or her skin." IL
Accordingly, it concluded that this standard provided no basis for abandoning Runyon.
See id. at 175.
50. Compare Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing
Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 153 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (adhering to Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 659-77 (1974), despite his view that it incorrectly interpreted the
Eleventh Amendment, on the ground that it "had previously been endorsed by some of
our finest Circuit Judges [and that] it therefore cannot be characterized as unreasonable or
egregiously incorrect"), with Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 304 (1985)
(Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that "additional study has made it abundantly clear"
that Edelman "can properly be characterized as 'egregiously incorrect' ").
Justice Harlan offered a comparable standard in his concurring opinion in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192-202 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds
by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In support of his view that
the Court should adhere to its decisions in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 321-29
(1941), and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 94-100 (1945), that municipalities are
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White's opinion for the Court in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co."
concluded that it was the Court's "prerogative" and also its "duty to

re-examine a precedent where its reasoning or understanding of the
Constitution is fairly called into question."5
On the other hand, an exception to the rule of stare decisis that

encourages a reexamination of the reason or justice of precedent
threatens to swallow the rule. Accordingly, members of the modem

Court occasionally have rejected the mere perception of error as a
basis for overturning precedent. Under this view, reversal requires
"special justification," and such justification presupposes something

more than the conclusion that the Court's prior decision was
irrational or unjust.5 3 The decision to set aside precedent must be

supported by "reasons,
demonstration

that

the

and reasons that go beyond mere
54
overruled

opinion

was

wrong."

"[O]therwise," Justice Scalia has stated, "the doctrine would be no
doctrine at all,"'55 and would accord an " 'arbitrary discretion in the
courts.' "56

At first glance, these apparent contradictions seem to provide
ample fodder for the various epithets aimed at the Court's overruling
rhetoric. If the Court cannot provide a uniform, consistent answer to
this most fundamental question of stare decisis, the cynical criticism
commonly directed at the Court's doctrine of precedent seems
immune from suit under the provision now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1997)
(previously codified at 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1946)), Justice Harlan suggested that "the policy of
stare decisis ... require[s] that it appear beyond doubt from the legislative history of the
1871 statute that Classic and Screws misapprehended the meaning of the controlling
provision, before a departure from what was decided in those cases would be justified."
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
51. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
52. Id. at 627-28. In Mitchell, the Court rejected a due process challenge to a state
procedure allowing a seller to sequester property upon an allegation of default by the
buyer, without prior notice to the buyer pending a hearing on the merits of the seller's
claim. The Court previously had invalidated similar procedures in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972).
53. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (asserting that the view has been "repeated in our
caseso that a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the
belief that a prior case was wrongly decided"); see also Gerhardt, supra note 5, at 145
(asserting that the current Court has embraced two stare decisis standards, one that
permits the overruling of precedents "deemed erroneously reasoned" and another that
"demand[s] something more than erroneous reasoning").
54. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
55. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
56. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting THE
FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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"understandable, perhaps even understated." 57 If the Court cannot
decide whether reversal for error is essential or is anathema to a
system of stare decisis, perhaps the "doctrine" is no more than cover
to be manipulated one way or the other, depending on whose
ideological ox is being gored.
This legal realist critique of the Court's treatment of error is
tempting, but it is not the only explanation for the apparent
contradictions noted above. The economic model suggests that there
may be some method to the Court's madness. Indeed, economic
analysis suggests that there should not be a single, universal answer to
the question whether error is a sufficient basis to set aside
precedent.58 Error may or may not be a sufficient justification to
overrule; it all depends on the relative costs and benefits at stake.
This Part analyzes the economic considerations that explain the
Court's apparent equivocation concerning its power of self-correction
and then examines those considerations in the context of two recent
cases in which the Court decided to overrule a prior decision.
The Costs of ErrorCorrection
In the first place, the costs of abandoning a precedent will vary
depending on the circumstances. As noted above,5 9 a decision to set
aside a precedent ordinarily is assumed to decrease the level of
certainty in the system and, thus, to encourage increased expenditures
on litigation. But that assumption will not be reliable in all cases;
sometimes there will be no reason to anticipate an increase in
litigation expenses because the existing precedent is already so
uncertain. Adjustment costs will also vary depending on the nature of
the precedent. Again, the usual assumption is that a change of course
from precedent will produce adjustment costs. But that assumption
may not hold in cases in which the precedent does not form the basis
for reasonable reliance.
When either or both of the usual assumptions about the costs of
an overruling decision break down, the economic model suggests that
reversal is more likely to be economically efficient. In other words,
error-cost savings will more likely be worth the price of reversal when
the elements of that price are reduced. As noted in detail below,'
this theory can explain several strands of the Court's doctrine of stare
A.

57. Lee, supranote 5, at 659.
58. To borrow Judge Easterbrook's words, "[N]o one can quantify how bad is bad
enough." Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 424.
59. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
60. See infra Parts Ill, IV, and V.
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decisis. One straightforward application of the point is offered here.
The Court often has adverted to the notion of enhanced protection of
"rules of property," on one hand, and of diminished protection of
"rules of procedure," on the other.6' Enhanced deference to rules of
property may be understood to hinge on the prediction that the
adjustment costs associated with overturning precedents establishing
such rules will be high.
Consider United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co.62 Title
Insurance involved a suit by the United States on behalf of certain
Mission Indians to grant them full title in land situated in southern
California.6'
The Indians' claim was based on a purported
entitlement growing out of their " 'continuous and undisturbed' "
occupancy and use of the land in question. 64 The title insurance
company, which claimed fee title in the land based on a patent from
the United States, defended on the ground that the Indians' claim had
been forfeited by the failure to bring it before a commission
established by statute to provide for "the ascertainment and
adjudication of private land claims in the ceded territory." 65 The
United States apparently conceded that the Indians had not
presented their claims to the commission, but argued that the Court
should not construe the statute in question to extinguish claims by
Indians to less than fee title-such as claims for a right of occupation,
use, and enjoyment.6 The defendants' primary response was to point
to the Court's rejection of similar arguments some two decades
earlier in Barker v. Harvey.67
The Court in Title Insurance rejected the United States's request
to overrule Barker,using strong adjustment-cost terms:
The decision [in Barker] was given twenty-three years ago
61. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (asserting that "[c]onsiderations in
favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights,
where reliance interests are involved," while the "opposite is true in cases ...involving
procedural and evidentiary rules").
62. 265 U.S. 472 (1924).
63. See id. at 481.
64. Id. at 482 (quoting the plaintiff's bill).
65. Id. at 481-82.
66. See id. at 476. The United States argued that "[g]eneral acts of Congress do not
apply to [Indians] at all unless so worded as clearly to manifest an intention to include
them" and that the statute in question did not manifest such a clear intention. Id. Instead,
the federal government argued, applying the statute to the Indians would have required
the Court to conclude that Congress entertained the absurd assumption that "wild
savages, or at best semi-civilized children" would become "aware of the proceedings of
Congress" and would "appear[] unaided before a white man's court." Id.
67. 181 U.S. 481 (1901); see Title Insurance,265 U.S. at 482.
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and affected many tracts of land in California, particularly in
the southern part of the State. In the meantime there has
been a continuous growth and development in that section,
land values have enhanced, and there have been many
transfers. Naturally there has been reliance on that decision.
The defendants in this case purchased fifteen years after it
was made. It has become a rule of property, and to disturb
it now would be fraught with many injurious results. 68
Reliance on Barker was both obvious and widespread. Numerous
tracts of land had been transferred in reliance on the determination
that any future claims to a right of occupation, use, and enjoyment by
Indians had been extinguished by their failure to bring such claims
before the commission established by statute. A decision overruling
Barker would have caused the purchasers of the parcels of land at
issue to incur substantial adjustment costs in defending against the
Indians' claims on the merits and in seeking indemnity for the cloud
on defendants' title against the sellers and their title company.
The adjustment costs of overruling Barker would not be limited
to those incurred by the defendant-buyers; the uncertainty created by
upsetting a rule of property like that established in Barker would
increase the transaction costs associated with the process of acquiring
real property. If buyers, sellers, title insurers, real estate agents, and
others involved in the real estate business perceive that they cannot
rely conclusively on the validity of case-law rules of title, then they
would undertake additional precautions aimed at clarifying the
strength of the title passed to a potential seller. Indeed, such costs
would bear directly upon buyers and sellers in the form of higher
premiums for title insurance and higher closing fees; some otherwise
economically beneficial transactions might even be thwarted if the
increased transaction costs were high enough.
Economic analysis also explains the proposition that the Court's
adherence to stare decisis is weakest in cases "involving procedural
and evidentiary rules."6 9 The adjustment costs associated with
overruling procedural and evidentiary rules should be predictably
low. Consider two recent decisions in which the Court reversed
precedents on the ground that they established merely procedural
rules: Payne v. Tennessee ° and United States v. Gaudin.7 Payne

68.
69.
70.
71.

Title Insurance,265 U.S. at 486.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
515 U.S. 506 (1995).
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overruled the decisions in Booth v. Marylandr and South Carolinav.
Gathers,73 which had held that the Eighth Amendment bars admission
of victim-impact evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial!754
The Gaudin Court overruled its decision in Sinclairv. United States
by holding that the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation to the
government is
a question of fact for the jury and not a question of law
76
judge.
the
for
In both instances, the Court suggested that an evidentiary or
procedural rule is susceptible to reversal because it does not control
'78
any "primary conduct"'77 or "serve as a guide to lawful behavior.
Both decisions can be understood in economic terms: procedural and
evidentiary rules can easily be replaced without engendering any
significant adjustment costs. If no decisions are made in reliance on a
rule, then there are no adjustment costs that flow from its
replacement. Thus, neither private nor governmental actors should
be expected to incur additional planning costs in response to a change
in the law regarding the admission of victim-impact evidence in
capital trials or regarding whether the judge or jury decides the
question of the "materiality" of an alleged misrepresentation to the
government. 79
72. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne,501 U.S. at 808.
73. 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruledby Payne,501 U.S. at 808.
74. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830.
75. 279 U.S. 263 (1929), overruledby Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521.
76. See Gaudin,515 U.S. at 522-23.
77. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 234 (1995) (asserting that
"reliance on a case that has recently departed from precedent is likely to be minimal,
particularly where, as here, the rule set forth in that case is unlikely to affect primary
conduct in any event"); see also Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 253 (1998),
overruling House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945) (per curiam). The Court in Hohn overruled
the House Court's conclusion that the Court lacked certiorari jurisdiction to review
refusals to issue probable cause certificates. Further, the Hohn Court noted that the rule
involved was procedural and did not alter primary conduct. Hohn, 524 U.S. at 251-53.
78. Gaudin,515 U.S. at 521, overruling Sinclair,279 U.S. at 263; see Payne, 501 U.S. at
828. Sinclair had held that the element of "pertinency" under the statute defining
contempt was to be decided by courts as a matter of law and not by the jury. Sinclair,279
U.S. at 298-99. The statute in Sinclair defined contempt as refusal to answer a " 'question
pertinent to [a] question under [congressional] inquiry.'" Id. at 285 (quoting 2 U.S.C.
§ 192). Gaudin held that the element of "materiality" under the relevant statute was a
matter of fact for the jury. See Gaudin,515 U.S. at 522-23.
79. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202-03 (1991)
(refusing to overrule Pardenv. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department,
377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled in part by College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999), and in part by Welch v. Texas
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987)). Pardenheld that a state-owned
railroad was not immune to an action in state court under the Federal Employers Liability
Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 198. In determining that it
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The dichotomy between rules of property and rules of procedure
illustrates the thesis of this Article: the Court's equivocation as to
whether the perception of error is a sufficient basis for reversal is fully
consistent with the economic model. This fundamental question
cannot be answered in the abstract. But if the costs ordinarily
associated with an overruling decision are unlikely to materialize,
then the expected error-cost savings associated with reversal may well
justify abandoning the usual presumption of deference to precedent.
B.

The Benefits of ErrorCorrection

Just as the costs of abandoning precedent will vary with the
circumstances, so too will the benefits. First, not all errors are created
equal. At one level, error may be defined to encompass any failure to
implement the will of the lawmaker as expressed in the statutory or
constitutional provision. But, because some errors may encompass
substantive inefficiencies that go beyond the failure to follow the
controlling legal document, by definition they are more costly, and,
thus, their correction will perform a more significant error-cost saving
function.
Second, not all perceived errors are actual errors. Just as the
Court that established the precedent in question may have erred in
arriving at its decision, so too the current Court may be wrong in its
evaluation of the propriety of the precedent. If the later Court errs in
its assessment that an earlier opinion is erroneous, overruling the
precedent will be doubly costly in that (1) it will give rise to litigation
and adjustment costs; and (2) instead of producing error-cost savings,
it will give rise to additional error costs.

should reaffirm Parden, the Hilton Court spoke in terms of adjustment costs: "Stare
decisis has added force when the legislature, in the public sphere, and citizens, in the
private realm, have acted in reliance on a previous decisions, for in this instance overruling
the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive
legislative response." Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202. Because state law excludes railroad
employees from workers' compensation coverage and relies instead on FELA's protective
measures for those workers, the Court noted that an injured railway worker "may be
precluded from seeking... [a] remedy.., for his injuries." Id-at 203. Overruling Parden,
the Court noted, "would require these States to reexamine their statutes, meanwhile
putting at risk all employees and employers who have been acting on the assumption that
l.
they are protected in the event of injuries caused by an employer's negligence."
Compare Mitchell v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 1316 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that Griffin v. California,380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), which held that the Self
Incrimination Clause barred a prosecutor or judge from commenting on a defendant's
refusal to testify, may be immune from being overruled because it "has found 'wide
acceptance in the legal culture' "(quoting Mitchell, 119 S. Ct. at 1316)), with id. at 1321-22
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (urging that Griffin be overruled).
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At least two elements of the Court's treatment of error in
precedent seem aimed at minimizing this risk. First, and most
obviously, are the variations on the notion that the Court must be
especially confident in its identification of an error before it acts to
correct it. This notion is one explanation for the apparent
contradiction in the Court's treatment of error in precedent. A
decision that has "plainly inadequate rational support"8 or is
"egregiously incorrect"'" may be ripe for reversal, but the "mere
demonstration" that an opinion is more than likely "wrong" is
insufficient to justify its rejection. 82
Economic analysis provides ample support for this dichotomy.
Reversal on a showing of error under a mere preponderance standard
would accord an " 'arbitrary discretion in the courts' "83 that would
produce consistent inefficiencies. If the current Court's confidence in
its perception of error barely exceeds the preponderance standard, an
overruling decision will be doubly costly in the sense noted above in
almost one-half of the cases (assuming that a 0.5 + E level of
confidence means that the Court will be wrong in its assessment of
error in 0.5 - Eof the cases). Any cost-savings gained in the other half
of the cases (actually, in 0.5 + E of the cases, in which the Court will
be correct in its assessment of error) would be unlikely to outweigh
the double costs expected to be incurred in the first half. If the Court
reserves the prerogative of self-reversal for opinions that are
perceived to be "egregiously incorrect" or to have "plainly
inadequate rational support," it is more likely to avoid imposing the
double costs associated with a misperception of error.
One practical difficulty with this standard is that its utility
80. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring); supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
81. See Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home
Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 153 (1081) (Stevens, J., concurring); supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
82. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (opining that stare decisis requires "that it appear beyond doubt"
that an earlier decision is in error before its reversal is justified), overruled on other
groundsby Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The requirement of
certainty traces its origins at least as far back as Blackstone, who recognized an exception
to stare decisis when the earlier decision is "evidently contrary to reason," "clearly
contrary to the divine law," or "manifestly absurd or unjust." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWs OF ENGLAND *69-70 (emphasis added); see also Lee,
supra note 5, at 661-62 (discussing Blackstone's writings within the historical perspective
of stare decisis).
83. Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 716 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supranote 56, at 471).
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depends on the current Court's willingness to exercise a certain
degree of humility in judging the merits of earlier

Courts'

precedents.84 Unfortunately, the natural tendency of many of us
(including, perhaps, some members of the Court) is to conclude that

our own views are obviously correct and that those with whom we
disagree are "egregiously incorrect." If this attitude prevails in every
case in which the Court identifies any error in precedent, the error-

correction bar will have been lowered to the mere preponderance
level, and the double-cost risk noted above will materialize.

Second, the Court has offered another limitation on its power of
error correction: the Court should reserve its prerogative of error
correction for cases in which the initial error stemmed from a failure
to appreciate circumstances and factors that are later brought to the
Court's attention," or from a lack of full briefing or consideration of
an issue. 6 These standards are economically justifiable on grounds
similar to those noted above. Abandoning an earlier opinion on the
basis of a more complete record or briefing than in the earlier case is
less likely to be based on mere second guessing of the substantive

merits of the earlier decision. Confining the power of error
correction to such cases will thus avoid the double-cost problem
noted above. 87
84. For an interesting discussion of the role of humility in judging, see Brett Scharffs,
The Role of Humility in ExercisingPracticalWisdom, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 127, 185-98
(1998).
85. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863-64 (1992) (plurality opinion
of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (suggesting that a reversal of course in precedent
may be called for when an overruling decision "rest[s] on facts, or an understanding of
facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier
constitutional resolutions"); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 410-11
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (suggesting that stare decisis is weakened in cases in which
the decision "is dependent upon the determination of what in legal parlance is called a
fact"), overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938),
and in part by Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
86. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 571,
572 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that
the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), is subject to
reconsideration because "the Smith rule was not subject to 'funl-dress argument' prior to
its announcement," and "a constitutional rule announced sua sponte is entitled to less
deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument"); Monell, 436 U.S. at 709 n.6
(Powell, J., concurring) ("I think we owe somewhat less deference to a decision that was
rendered without benefit of a full airing of all the relevant considerations.").
87. Although this standard has a prophylactic dimension to it, it too is subject to some
degree of manipulation. The opposing opinions in Casey, for example, disagreed about
whether two of the most esteemed overruling decisions in the Court's history, West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937), which effectively overruled Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which
overruled Plessy v. Ferguson,163 U.S. 537 (1896), were consistent with this standard. The
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In sum, the Court's apparent inconsistency as to the extent of its
prerogative of self-correction is fully consistent with the economic
model. When the usual price of reversal (increased LC or AC) is
diminished or when the expected benefit of reversal (decreased EC)
is especially clear error may well be a sufficient basis for overturning
precedent. More detailed illustrations of the circumstances in which
this may be true are offered in subsequent Parts of this Article.
I. ECONOMICS AND UNWORKABLE PRECEDENT

The Supreme Court has frequently suggested that its capacity for
error correction is enhanced when the precedent in question is
"unworkable." Aside from the general invocation of the notion that
unworkable decisions are more vulnerable to reversal, however, the
Court has offered little guidance as to the extent of unworkability that
justifies abandoning a precedent or even as to the theoretical basis for
this strand of the doctrine.
The competing opinions in United States v. Dixon88 illustrate the
point. 9 Dixon overruled Grady v. Corbin,90 which had announced a
"same conduct" test under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.f The "same conduct" test under Grady prohibited a
subsequent prosecution when, "to establish an essential element of an
offense charged in that prosecution, [the government] will prove
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted." 9 Before Grady, the Court had applied
only the "same element" test announced in Blockburger v. United
States,93 under which double jeopardy barred additional punishment
and successive prosecution only if the second offense contained an
plurality reasoned that they were consistent, in that "[e]ach case was comprehensible as
the Court's response to facts that the country could understand, or had come to
understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day, as its own declarations
disclosed, had not been able to perceive." Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64 (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent argued to the
contrary: "West Coast Hotel ...did not state that Lochner had been based on an
economic view that had fallen into disfavor," but "simply recognized ...that '[t]he
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.'" Id. at 960-61 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391). Moreover, the Chief Justice
noted, "the same arguments made before the Court in Brown were made in Plessy as
well." Id. at 962 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
88. 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
89. The background discussion of Grady borrows substantially from Lee, supra note

5, at 657-58.
90.
91.
92.
93.

495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. at 688.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Dixon, 509 U.S. at 711-12.
Grady, 495 U.S. at 521-22.
284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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element that was also included in the first offense. 94 Dixon
abandoned Grady's same conduct test and reverted to the
Blockburger test as the sole inquiry under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 95
The majority and dissenting opinions in Dixon engaged in a
vacuous debate about whether Grady had produced sufficient
"confusion" to sustain the unworkability exception to stare decisis. 6
According to Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, Grady was
"unworkable" and "unstable in application." 97 Specifically, Justice
Scalia noted that the Court had recognized a "large exception" to the
test announced in Grady, that lower courts had complained that
Grady was "difficult to apply," and that Supreme Court decisions
interpreting Grady had resulted in divided opinions.98 Justice
Souter's dissent acknowledged "that two Court of Appeals decisions
ha[d] described [Grady] as difficult to apply," 99 but he confidently
declared that this was not the "type of 'confusion' ... that can

somehow obviate our obligation to adhere to precedent.""°
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Dixon offered any
explanation of the significance of the apparent "confusion" under
Grady, much less a basis for their competing views of the level of
confusion necessary to justify a change in precedent. This Part uses
the economic model to develop a substantive basis for the Court's
suggestion that unworkable precedent is particularly vulnerable to
reversal. After offering a theoretical explanation for this strand of
the Court's doctrine of precedent, this Part tests the theory by
applying it to the Dixon case and to other recent cases in which the
unworkability notion has come into play.
A.

Unworkable Precedentand the Economic Model

The economic model suggests that confusion in applying a
precedent is significant because it undermines some of the principal
economic functions of precedent. Adherence to precedent is usually
the cost-minimizing course of action, in part because a change of
course tends to increase the expected cost and volume of litigation.
But when precedent produces confusion in the form of unpredictable
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See iLat 304.
See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 711-12.
See id at 709-12; id. at 759-61 (Souter, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 709-10.
Id.
Id. at 759 (Souter, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting in part).
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results, the costs resulting from retaining the "unworkable" decision
generally may outweigh the uncertainty created by overturning the
precedent. Precedent that yields random, unpredictable outcomes
will encourage a litigant to pursue litigation and eschew settlement.''
The costs associated with such encouragement may well outweigh the
increased litigation expenses ordinarily thought to accompany a
decision overruling precedent.
A similar analysis focuses on the adjustment cost element of the
economic model. Ordinarily, adherence to precedent minimizes
adjustment costs by encouraging efficient reliance on the law and by
avoiding the costs associated with adjustment to a new legal regime.
But again, this expectation does not apply to precedent that is
"unworkable."
If the precedent in question is incapable of
predictable application in the lower courts, efficient reliance will not
be possible.
Indeed, unworkable decisions are by definition
uncertain, so their retention should be expected to require ongoing
and inefficient expenditures on measures aimed at divining their
application and effect." z Although adjustment to the replacement
regime may impose some costs, those costs may be outweighed by the
costs associated with the previous, unprincipled approach.
Thus, when precedent is unworkable, the condition for reversal
[EC(Y) > AC(X) + LC(X)] more likely will be satisfied because the
overruling of an unworkable precedent is less likely to give rise to
significant adjustment and litigation costs than would its retention. In
terms of the model, although the general presumption is that
EC(Y) <AC(X) + LC(X), that presumption will not apply to
unworkable precedents because, even assuming that the magnitude of
the EC variable is unaffected by the unworkability of a decision,
AC'+ LC' < ACV + LCW (where U denotes unworkable precedent

and W denotes workable precedent). Indeed, the unworkability
necessary to justify reversal may be defined under the model as the
degree
of
uncertainty
of
application
that
renders
EC(Y) > ACU(X) + LCu(X).

101. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
102. Cf Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 11, at 271 (noting that "[h]igher levels of ability
and training are required to master implicit rules" and thus predicting "that lawyers will be
more numerous" when legal rules are predominantly "implicit").
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Unworkable Precedentin the Rehnquist Court

1. United States v. Dixon
United States v. Dixon's reversal of Grady v. Corbin may be
understood in the economic terms set forth above. Rejection of
Grady's "same conduct" test might add generally to the level of
uncertainty in the law of double jeopardy by increasing the
perception that the Court's precedents are susceptible to reversal.
But any marginal increase in litigation costs resulting from this
general decrease in certainty likely would be outweighed by a more
specific, offsetting increasein certainty associated with abandoning an
unworkable decision like Grady.
Several specific cases that followed on the heels of Grady
provide anecdotal evidence of this effect. For example, in United
States v. Felix'03 the Court decided whether a previous conviction for
attempt to manufacture methamphetamine barred a subsequent°4
prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture the same substance.
Despite "'longstanding authority' to the effect that prosecution for
conspiracy is not precluded by prior prosecution for the substantive
offense,"'" 5 Grady stood as an enticement to litigate the question on
the ground that prosecution for conspiracy would involve proof of
conduct that constituted the underlying substantive offense.
As Felix itself illustrates, an unworkable precedent like Grady
can lead to a predictable increase in litigation expenses in two ways.
First, unworkable precedents encourage litigation-and arguments
within litigation-that would not be raised in the absence of the
precedent. Grady's effect on the incentives for litigation were real
and palpable; everyone acknowledged that if Blockburger0° was the
sole test for double jeopardy, the defense's double jeopardy claim
would have bordered on the frivolous.' ° As the Court noted in Felix,
however, a "literalfl" application of Grady would support the double
103. 503 U.S. 378 (1992).
104. See id. at 384.
105. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 709 (quoting Felix, 503 U.S. at 390).
106. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); see supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text.
107. Two effects of Grady should be distinguished. First, as a supplemental test to that
in Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, Grady inevitably would encourage more litigation than
would Blockburger alone. Two alternative formulations of the double jeopardy protection
would necessarily give rise to more litigation than would one test alone. But that isolated
fact does not render Grady unworkable. Rather, it is only to the extent that Grady's test
encourages litigation by its confusion and inconsistency that it can be said to be
unworkable under stare decisis jurisprudence.
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jeopardy defense, since Grady "said that the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars a prosecution where the Government, 'to establish an essential
element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted.' "103 So long as Grady's same conduct test remained, it
stood as an enticement for double-jeopardy arguments that would
otherwise be left unasserted.
Second, unworkable precedent like Grady tends to increase
litigation expenses by expanding the scope, complexity, and cost of
resolution of the litigation once it has begun. Even if Felix and his
counsel made the initial determination to pursue a double jeopardy
challenge in the absence of Grady, resolution of that challenge would
have been relatively inexpensive. It probably would have been
rejected summarily by the trial judge and, if made part of an appeal,
by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished, per curiam opinion.
Indeed, Felix's gloss on Grady further exacerbated the
uncertainty and incentive for costly litigation on double jeopardy
issues. After Felix, Grady's already ambiguous "same conduct" test
was further clouded by Felix's admonition that the test was not to be
read "literally."'1
Lower courts understandably found the
Grady/Felix standard "difficult to apply,"' 10 and expressly noted that
the Blockburger test would have forestalled protracted litigation over
double jeopardy."'
As noted above, judicial adjustment to a replacement precedent
often may be an additional source of increased litigation
expenditures.
Even if that condition generally cuts against
abandoning precedent, it should have had little impact on the calculus
in Dixon. The expected increase in litigation from a new regime is
especially low when the decision omits one of a set of alternative
tests. When, as in Dixon, we already have judicial experience under
the new regime, start-up litigation costs will be low and should not
stand as a significant impediment to abandoning precedent.
Dixon also illustrates the point that reversal of unworkable
precedent is unlikely to produce significant adjustment costs.
108. Felix, 503 U.S. at 388 (quoting Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508,521 (1990)).
109. Id.
110. Sharpton v. Turner, 964 F.2d 1284, 1287 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v.
Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 722 (2d Cir. 1990) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 503 U.S. 978 (1992); id. at 726 (Miner, J., dissenting)).
111. See id. at 1287 (concluding that "[p]rior to Grady," the court "would have been
entirely confident that under the previous regime of Blockburger," defendant's "double
jeopardy claim would fail").
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Initially, one might assume that double-jeopardy rules are unlikely to
affect the primary behavior of potential criminal defendants, so that
the reliance effects of a double-jeopardy precedent may be less than
those in other areas of the law."' But that is not to say that reliance
effects are not implicated. Criminal defendants undoubtedly rely on
the state of the law of double jeopardy in deciding Whether to accept
plea bargains. Likewise, prosecutors rely on double-jeopardy rules in
their day-to-day decisions regarding the nature and extent of the
charges to bring. The economic model generally predicts that
upsetting a double-jeopardy precedent would increase uncertainty
and would thus discourage efficient reliance by prosecutors.
Significantly, the economic model indicates that this prediction
will not hold when the precedent is unworkable. Indeed, with Grady
on the books, prosecutors would have difficulty knowing when they
must simultaneously prosecute all charges arising out of a single
criminal transaction or occurrence and when they may leave some
charges for a future prosecution." In the face of this uncertainty,
prosecutors may make inefficient decisions to use scarce resources to
prosecute crimes that may turn out not to be worth the effort. A
clearer rule would allow prosecutors to allocate their resources more
efficiently without fear that an initial decision to file only a narrow set
of charges might unexpectedly preclude prosecution of related
charges in the future. Thus, the predictable result of abandoning this
unpredictable precedent would be to clarify the double-jeopardy
standard for prosecutors and to enable them to exercise their
prosecutorial discretion under a more predictable rule of law." 4
112. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 243 (acknowledging that "[t]he notion of the
criminal as a rational calculator will strike many readers as unrealistic, especially when
applied to criminals having little education or to crimes not committed for pecuniary
gain," but insisting that "a better test of a theory than the realism of its assumptions is its
predictive power" and noting that "[a] growing empirical literature on crime has shown
that criminals respond to changes in opportunity costs, in the probability of apprehension,
[and] in the severity of punishment" (citing Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the
Market for Offenses, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1996, at 43, 55-63; D.J. Pyle, The Economic
Approach to Crime and Punishment,6 J. INTERDIsc. ECON. 1, 4-8 (1995))).
113. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 540 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that after Grady,
prosecutors wishing to "use facts sufficient to prove one crime in order to establish guilt of
another crime must bring both prosecutions simultaneously; but that those who wish to
use only some of the facts establishing one crime-not enough facts to 'prove conduct that
constitutes an offense'-can bring successive prosecutions," and asserting that prosecutors
and trial judges will find it impossible to draw this line (quoting id. at 510)).
114. As noted above, criminal defendants may also rely on the state of doublejeopardy law during plea bargaining. If uncertainty as to the possibility of future
prosecutions interferes with efficient plea bargaining, reversal of an unworkable, and
hence uncertain, precedent would enhance certainty and thus improve the efficiency of the
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The investment ordinarily associated with reaction to a new legal
regime also would be minimal in this context. Since rejection of
Grady merely involves retention of Blockburger, rather than
substitution of an entirely new legal standard, adjustment costs in the
form of new institutional investments in a replacement regime will be
slight, or perhaps nonexistent." 5
2. Seminole Tribe v. Florida
The analysis of the litigation-cost issues presented in Dixon is
equally applicable to other cases in which the Court has overturned
precedent because of its unworkability. The Court in Seminole Tribe
v. Florida,"6 for example, overruled as unworkable the decision in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.," 7 which had held that Congress had

the power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate a State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity so long as it expressed a "clear statement" of
its intent to do so."' Union Gas's unworkability stemmed from the
lack of a majority opinion. Justice White's concurrence agreed with
the judgment reached by Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, but his
refusal to sign on to Brennan's rationale left lower courts to wonder
whether the clear statement principle was good law. Under the
circumstances, the Seminole Tribe Court suggested that Union Gas
was ripe for reversal because it was "of questionable precedential
plea-bargaining process.
115. A further argument for Dixon's reversal of Grady may be made in error-cost
terms. Grady is vulnerable to a challenge on substantive efficiency grounds. By increasing
the scope of the double-jeopardy protection, Grady limits the flexibility of prosecutors in
determining the breadth of charges to include in their initial proceeding. In so doing,
Grady tends to induce inefficiencies as prosecutors pursue expansive criminal proceedings
that include charges which might never be prosecuted otherwise.
A proponent of Grady might counter that a comprehensive criminal proceeding
including all potential charges arising out of a given transaction could be more efficient
than two, or more, successive proceedings. But that argument improperly assumes that
the successive proceedings ultimately would be pursued. Grady's principal substantive
inefficiency is in interfering with a prosecutor's discretion. Because the prosecutor has an
incentive to use his resources efficiently, we may assume that he will forego potential
charges arising out of a transaction that is the subject of a criminal proceeding only when
the expected benefit of that decision-which includes some prediction as to the likelihood
that the additional charges will be made part of a successive prosecution--exceeds the
expected cost-which includes the foregone economies of scale associated with a
consolidated proceeding. That is not to say that the prosecutor will always choose the
narrowest possible charge at the initial proceeding. The inefficiency lies in the fact that a
rational prosecutor will sometimes choose a pared-down set of charges and that Grady
interferes with that decision.
116. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
117. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruledby Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
118. See id. at 15 (plurality opinion).
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value, largely because a majority1' of
the Court expressly disagreed
9
plurality.
the
of
rationale
with the
This conclusion can be understood in terms of the economic
model: rejection of Union Gas was unlikely to increase litigation
costs by increasing uncertainty because the lack of majority support
for the decision had already created an uncertain state of affairs.
Notably, as in Dixon, the rejection of Union Gas would not be
expected to spawn the litigation costs associated with the replacement
of precedent by a new rule. This expectation stems from the narrow
holding of the case: Seminole Tribe did not replace the clear
statement rule with any competing principle, but rather simply
repossessed from Congress the purported power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence in Itel ContainersInternationalCorp.
v. Huddleston
The economic model also may explain Justice Scalia's approach
to the unworkability of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause' 20
precedents. In Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston,
Justice Scalia reiterated his "view that the Commerce Clause contains
no 'negative' component, no self-operative prohibition upon the
States' regulation of commerce. ' ' "m Nevertheless, in light of stare
decisis, Justice Scalia indicated that he would "enforce a selfexecuting, 'negative' Commerce Clause in two circumstances: (1)
against a state law that facially discriminates against interstate
commerce; and (2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from a
type of law previously held unconstitutional by this Court."'"
In the two circumstances that Justice Scalia identified, the usual
assumptions about the cost effects of reversal prevail. The
prohibition against state laws that facially discriminate against
interstate commerce establishes a relatively bright line that is capable
of consistent application; therefore, rejecting that prohibition would
increase litigation and adjustment costs by increasing uncertainty and
by undercutting private and institutional reliance on the rule.
119. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
120. The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from burdening interstate
commerce. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
121. 507 U.S. 60 (1993).
122. ML at 78 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing
American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202-03 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
123. Id. at 78-79 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Similarly, state laws that are "indistinguishable 12 4 from laws
previously held unconstitutional rest on the presumed validity of
established precedents.
Accordingly, the same litigation- and
adjustment-cost effects would flow from a refusal to follow those
precedents to their logical conclusions.
Outside of those two circumstances, however, Justice Scalia
concluded that the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
is unworkable in the sense that it establishes "vague and open-ended
tests" that "are so uncertain in their application (and in their
anticipated life span) that they can hardly be said to foster stability or
to engender reliance deserving of stare decisis protection."1 2s In
economic terms, Justice Scalia's argument is the now-familiar point
that reversal of unworkable precedent will not produce significant
litigation or adjustment costs because the precedent itself is uncertain.
Because individual and governmental actors cannot reasonably be
expected to have efficiently structured their business and institutional
arrangements around the Court's "vague and open-ended" dormant
Commerce Clause tests, abandoning those tests would not produce
significant adjustment costs. Nor would it give rise to any significant
litigation costs, particularly when the replacement for the standard in
question would be no prohibition at all. 26
124. Id. at 79 (Scalia, I., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. Id. at 79-80 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
126. Cf. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 110-11 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In Rutan, Justice Scalia argued that the Court should overrule Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507 (1980), which held that patronage dismissals are unconstitutional unless "the hiring
authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the
effective performance of the public office involved." Id. at 518. As in Itel Containers,
Justice Scalia's argument in Rutan in support of reversal turned on the perceived
unworkability of the Branti standard:
What [Branti] means is anybody's guess. The Courts of Appeals have devised
various tests for determining when "affiliation is an appropriate requirement."
These interpretations of Branti are not only significantly at variance with each
other; they are still so general that for most positions it is impossible to know
whether party affiliation is a permissible requirement until a court renders its
decision.
A few examples will illustrate the shambles Branti has produced. A city
cannot fire a deputy sheriff because of his political affiliation, but then again
perhaps it can, especially if he is called the "police captain." A county cannot
fire on that basis its attorney for the department of social services, nor its
assistant attorney for family court, but a city can fire its solicitor and his
assistants, or its assistant city attorney, or its assistant state's attorney, or its
corporation counsel.
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 111-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted). As in
Itel Containers,Scalia's argument may be rephrased in economic terms. There simply is
no cost basis for preserving Brand if its incapability of principled application (1) suggests
that its reversal may actually decrease litigation expenses; and (2) indicates that there are
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IV. ECONOIUCS AND UNDERMINED AUTHORITY

A further strand of the Supreme Court's doctrine of precedent
holds that its capacity for error correction is enhanced when an
earlier decision has been "undermined," although not actually
overruled, by subsequent authority. 2 7 The logic of this standard has
been criticized in academic commentary,' 28 and, as with the doctrine
of unworkable precedent, the Court's opinions offer little explanation
of the standard's theoretical basis.
Consider the recent Establishment Clause case Agostini v.
Felton.129 Agostini overruled the Court's earlier decision in Aguilar v.
Felton,"10 which had held that a federal program sending public school
teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education to
disadvantaged children violated the Establishment Clause.' 3' In
abandoning Aguilar, the Agostini majority relied on the notion that
"stare decisis does not prevent us from overruling a previous decision
where there has been a significant change in or subsequent
and reasoned that
development of our constitutional law"'3
no significant reliance interests at stake.
127. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1997) (suggesting that the
Court's prior decisions holding that the Establishment Clause precluded federal funding of
programs on parochial school premises were ripe for reversal because there had been a
"significant change in or subsequent development of our constitutional law"); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (noting that Union Gas was a "solitary departure

from established law" and was of "questionable precedential value, largely because a
majority of the [Union Gas] Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality"),
overrulingPennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); United States v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506, 521 (1995) (noting that Sinclair v. United States's "underpinnings" had been
"eroded ... by subsequent decisions of this Court"), overruling Sinclair v. United States,
279 U.S. 263 (1929); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688,704,709-10 (1993) (abandoning
the Double Jeopardy Clause "same conduct" test under Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508
(1990), and asserting that Grady was "wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court
precedent" and that Grady's foundations were undermined by United States v. Felix, 503
U.S. 378 (1992), which "recognize[d] a large exception" that "avoid[ed] a 'literal' (i.e.,
faithful) reading of Grady" (quoting Felix, 503 U.S. at 88)); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (stating that the special justification necessary to overturn
a precedent may be established by a showing that intervening developments in the law
remove or weaken "the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision" or make "the
decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies").
128. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May
CongressRemove the PrecedentialEffect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. (forthcoming

May 2000) (manuscript at 122, on file with the North CarolinaLaw Review) (asserting that
a "less grandiloquentl]" version of this strand of the Court's doctrine is the notion that
"[i]t's okay to overrule precedent if you do it in two (or more) steps").
129. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
130. 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235-37.
131. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 208-09.
132. Id. at 235-36.
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subsequent "bona fide changes" in the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence had undermined Aguilar.'
As in United States v. Dixon," Justice Souter was the principal
dissenter. 35 Justice Souter's response to the majority again revealed
the analytical emptiness of the Court's treatment of undermined
authority. To Justice Souter, the doctrinal changes that the majority
had identified were insufficient to justify abandoning Aguilar.136 The
degree of doctrinal change, in Justice Souter's view, had been
"exaggerated" by the majority and fell short of that necessary to mark
Aguilar as undermined precedent. 37
The competing opinions
effectively argue past each other on this point; neither stops to offer a
theoretical basis for the notion that undermined authority is of
weakened precedential value, much less to articulate why the degree
of doctrinal change in Aguilar's wake was or was not enough to justify
its reversal. Economics may be used to fill this theoretical void. This
Part offers an economic basis for understanding this strand of the
Court's doctrine of precedent and then illustrates the theory by
applying it to some recent cases.
A.

The Economics of UnderminedAuthority

The economic foundations of this strand of the Court's doctrine
of precedent overlap substantially with those that form the basis of
the unworkability strand. Here again, reversal of undermined
authority seems unlikely to engender the two costs ordinarily
associated with a change in precedent.
First, reversal of a decision that has been substantially
undermined by subsequent authority is unlikely to increase litigation
costs; in fact, the converse is probably true. To see why, consider the
effects on incentives for litigation of a precedent that is doctrinally
irreconcilable with subsequent decisions. Although preserving a
precedent ordinarily would be expected to enhance certainty and thus
to diminish the incentive for litigation, keeping a precedential pariah
may have the opposite effect. Litigants on one side of a controversy
may look to the recent precedents to support their position, but their
opponents will hold out the hope of succeeding in reliance on the
now-undermined decision.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 238-39.
See supra Part III.B.1.
See Aguilar,473 U.S. at 414; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 240-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 252 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 250-52 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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So long as lower courts are forced to choose between two sets of

competing decisions, there will be cause for the mutual optimism that
is the prerequisite to extended-and expensive-litigation. 3 ' Only by

forthrightly overruling the undermined precedent can the Court
remove the grounds for mutual optimism that threaten to enhance
litigation costs.

139

In this sense, the usual assumption about the

litigation-cost effects of reversal is turned on its head; reversal of
undermined authority should decrease litigation costs over time.

Undermined authority, then, might be thought of in economic terms
as precedent that creates grounds for mutual optimism between

opponents in litigation.
Second, reversal of an undermined decision is unlikely to upset
private or institutional reliance interests.

A precedent whose

doctrinal basis has eroded is unlikely to establish a predictable
foundation for significant reliance. Again, certainty and reliance may
in one sense be enhanced by reversal. 40 Competing sets of precedents
may induce private and public actors to invest in inefficient measures
aimed at complying with both. Removing the offending decision will
increase certainty and allow for more efficient reliance. 4 '
138. See Shavell, supra note 24, at 63-64; see also POSNER, supra note 24, at 610
(concluding that "litigation will occur only if both parties are optimistic about the outcome
of the litigation"); id. at 611 (suggesting that "full exchange of the information... is likely
to facilitate settlement by enabling each party to form a more accurate... estimate of the
likely outcome of the case"); Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof- The Economics of
Legal Burdens, 1997 BYU L. REv. 1,15 n.36 (discussing the effects of mutual optimism on
the economic rationale for the default rule assigning the burden of proof in civil cases to
plaintiffs).
139. The same result might be achieved gradually over time as the undermined
precedent deteriorates further and makes the transition from "undermined" to
"abandoned" authority. In the meantime, however, a decision that is weakened but not
removed will generate the litigation costs noted here.
140. In a second sense, there may be a risk in some cases of upsetting certain reliance
interests even in the case of an undermined precedent. The reliance interests at issue here
are those constructed around the precise facts of the undermined decision. In our current
system, the result of a Supreme Court decision-unless and until it is overturned by the
Court itself-entitles private actors to reliance, even if more recent authority calls into
question the rationaleof the decision. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 721-22
(1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that parties and lower courts must expect
that the "precise holding" of Supreme Court decisions will be retained even when the
rationale of such decisions has been eroded). Thus, even if the undermined decision's
rationale does not generally contribute to a predictable body of law that will enable
efficient reliance, overturning the precise result of the case may undercut specific
investment in reliance on the result of that decision.
141. The Court also has occasionally made reference to another strand of the doctrine
of stare decisis that is linguistically similar to that of undermined authority but that may
not share its economic foundations: a decision that itself undermines prior authority may
be especially susceptible to reversal. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
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At the extreme, a thoroughly undermined precedent may be
reversed with minimal risk of significant litigation or
adjustment costs. Thus, as with unworkable authority, the costminimizing condition for reversal [EC(Y) > AC(X) + LC(X)]
is
more likely to be satisfied for undermined authority because
AC(X)U + LC(X)u< AC(X)N + LC(X)N (where U denotes undermined
precedent and N denotes non-undermined precedent). Again, a
decision is sufficiently undermined to justify reversal at the point at
which EC(Y) > ACU(X) + LCu(X).

B.

UndenninedAuthority in the Rehnquist Court
An examination of recent cases in which the Rehnquist Court
has set aside earlier precedents on the ground that they had been
undermined by more recent authority illustrates these economic
considerations. This Section discusses three prominent decisions
recently handed down.
1. Agostini v. Felton

Justice O'Connor's argument for the majority in Agostini can be
231-32 (1995) (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J.) (asserting that "'stare
decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a
prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by
experience'" (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940))); see also POSNER,
supra note 17, at 122 (noting that although judges who "flout precedent ... will be
criticized," successive judges who do so "will be criticized less ... both because their
flouting will be defensible as a method of correcting or punishing the misbehavior of their
predecessors and because they will have a 'precedent' for not following precedent"). In
one sense, "undermining" authority may be the economic equivalent of "undermined"
authority at least if it is confined to cases in which the undermining decision creates
uncertainty and introduces grounds for mutual optimism as indicated above. But, this
strand of the doctrine threatens to extend itself well beyond these sound bases. If the
effect of the purportedly undermining decision is merely to upend the rule of an earlier
]precedent and to replace it with a contrary principle adopted in a subsequent case and not
to create uncertainty about whether the former or recent decision controls in any given
case, then there may be no basis for this strand of the doctrine beyond whatever cathartic
effects may flow from the feeling that turnabout is fair play. In such cases, there may be
other cost considerations that sustain a reversal, such as the fact that the undermining
decision was handed down only recently and has not engendered any significant reliance
interests. See, e.g., Oregon ex reL State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 381-82 (1977), overrulingBonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973). Bonelli
had set aside a rule of property that had governed for almost a century, see Bonelli, 414
U.S. at 319-21, and the Corvallis Sand Court concluded that "a return to the former
[regime that prevailed prior to Bonelli] would more closely conform to the expectations of
property owners than would adherence to the latter." Corvallis Sand, 429 U.S. at 381-82.
But, the mere fact that a decision itself disregarded prior precedent does not seem to be a
legitimate basis for assigning it diminished precedential strength.
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restated in economic terms. Preservation of the pre-Agostini state of
the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine arguably would have
created more uncertainty and a greater incentive for litigation than
Agostini itself did. In Justice O'Connor's view, Aguilar v. Felton was
premised on the notions that (1) a public employee working on the
premises of a parochial school would presumptively "inculcate
religion in her work"; and that (2) public aid directed to an
educational function of a parochial school "impermissibly finances
religious indoctrination."' 4 2 After the Court's later decisions in
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District413 and Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 14 however, the
Court noted that the above notions were insufficient to sustain the
conclusion that a governmental program granting aid to parochial
schools on equal footing with other schools effectively advanced
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Zobrest upheld the
use of a federally funded sign-language interpreter by a student in a
Catholic high school and, in so doing, rejected the presumption that a
government employee in a parochial school setting necessarily would
result in state-sponsored indoctrination. 145 Witters upheld the use of a
state-sponsored vocational tuition grant by a blind person who chose
to use the grant to attend a Christian college and become a pastor,
missionary, or youth director. There, the Court disavowed the notion
that all government aid that directly facilitates the educational
function of religious schools is invalid. 46
The Agostini majority's position could be restated to rest on the
conclusion that undermined precedent is not as economically valuable
as other precedent. Whereas litigation expenses ordinarily would be
expected to increase as a result of the substitution of new precedent
for old, that expectation arguably would not hold in Agostini. Before
Agostini, Establishment Clause jurisprudence provided a significant
incentive for litigation over the constitutionality of government
programs benefiting parochial schools. On one hand, Zobrest and
Witters offered some assurance that such a program could be
sustained-without fear of an "absolute bar to the placing of a public

142. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222:
143. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
144. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
145. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13 (disavowing the notion that "the Establishment Clause
lays down [an] absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian school").

146. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (noting that the benefit to the religious institution was
the result of "the genuinely independent and private choices" of individuals and not of the
decision of the state).
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employee in a sectarian school"' 47 -so long as it provided aid
neutrally to eligible recipients " 'without regard to the sectariannonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefited.' "I's But unless overruled, Aguilar stood as an arrow in the
quiver of any potential litigant wishing to argue that a government
149
benefit improperly constituted "direct aid" to religious schools.
The resulting uncertainty would directly encourage litigation to a
degree that would outweigh the indirect effect of the general
"uncertainty" created by any individual decision to set aside
precedent.
Justice O'Connor also might have argued that rejection of
Aguilar could decrease adjustment costs. With Aguilar, Zobrest, and
Witters all on the books, a governmental entity hardly could be
expected to make efficient decisions about an anticipated benefits
program. In contemplating any such program, the government would
have to invest not only legal resources in an attempt to divine the
proper reconciliation of the three cases-Aguilar, Zobrest, and
Witters,--but also other resources to design the program in such a
way as to navigate the shoals of the competing precedents.
Moreover, the adjustment-cost effects of Agostini would be
minimized further because that case merely adopted one of two
competing tests already in existence, rather than jettisoning the
existing doctrine in favor of a brand new one.
As noted above,'15 reversal of even an abandoned precedent
might ordinarily be expected to undercut reliance specifically built
around the result of the decision in question. Even this consideration,
however, is of minimal significance in Agostini. Aguilar was a
decision proscribingthe provision of Title I services within parochial
schools; such a decision should not be expected to sustain the same
sort of institutional investment that would be built around a decision
authorizinggovernmental action.' 5' And although there undoubtedly
had been some investment in facilities for providing government
147. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13.
148. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.

Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,782 n.38 (1973)).
149. See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393 (1985) (distinguishing the permissible
provision of "'indirect, remote, or incidental'" aid from the impermissible provision of
more significant and direct aid (quoting Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. at 771
(internal quotations omitted))), overruledby Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
150. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
151. The implication of this analysis, of course, is that an efficient system of stare
decisis has an inherent bias-all other things being equal-in favor of conduct-authorizing
precedent as compared to conduct-proscribing precedent.
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services off the premises of the parochial schools, 152 the existence of
such sunk costs is not an argument for imposing further such costs.
In fact, the potential for avoiding future investment in such
facilities can be understood as a significant error-cost saving
associated with setting aside the decision in Aguilar. Thus, in
addition to making the point that the costs of overturning Aguilar
were exceptionally low (if not negative), Justice O'Connor's opinion
can be read to assert that the anticipated benefits were
extraordinarily high. In addition to yielding the standard benefit
associated with restoring consistency between the Court's precedents
and the intent of the Constitution, Agostini corrected other, more
quantifiable, inefficiencies. Indeed, Justice O'Connor spelled out the
substantive efficiency costs of Aguilar in extensive detail. She noted
that since the 1986-87 school year, the New York City Board of
Education had spent more than $100 million in attempting to comply
with Aguilar's mandate by "providing computer-aided instruction,
leasing sites and mobile instructional units, and transporting students
to those sites."'153 These and other costs could be avoided by setting
Aguilar aside.
The above catalog of the relevant cost considerations before the
Court in Agostini sets the stage for a meaningful debate about the
propriety of a departure from stare decisis. Instead of a pointless
debate about whether the degree of doctrinal change after Aguilar
was in some abstract sense "sufficient," the economic model enables
more concrete debate. Justice Souter's dissenting position is difficult
to justify under such a framework. First, Justice Souter conceded that
the costs of Aguilar were substantial:
When Aguilar was decided everyone knew that providing
Title I services off the premises of the religious schools
would come at substantial cost in efficiency, convenience,
and money. Title I had begun off the premises in New York,
after all, and dissatisfaction with the arrangement was what
led the city to put the public school teachers into the

152. See, e.g., Jeff Gauger, District 66 Board Approves Plan for Offering Remedial
Education, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Aug. 27, 1985, available in 1985 WL 3817079

(discussing the Omaha school district's plan to comply with Aguilar by transporting
private school students to public schools for remedial classes); Joan McQueeney Mitric,
Catholic Schools Seek Sites for U.S.-Funded Special Aid to Pupils, WASH. POST, Oct. 24,
1985, at Md.1 (discussing the busing system used by Maryland public schools to comply
with Aguilar); Neill S. Rosenfeld, Classroom Vans Draw High Bids, NEWSDAY (New
York), Apr. 16, 1986, at 35, available in 1986 WL 2359073 (discussing the use of mobile
classrooms to comply with the Aguilardecision).
153. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 213.
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religious schools in the first place. When Aguilar required
the end of that arrangement, conditions reverted to those of
the past and they have remained unchanged: teaching
conditions are often poor, it is difficult to move children
around, and it costs a lot of money.' 4
Thus, support for Justice Souter's position as to the stare decisis
effects of Aguilar would require some rebuttal of the litigation- and
adjustment-cost points noted above. Such a rebuttal is difficult under
the circumstances.
Justice Souter's principal stare decisis argument in dissent was
that the majority had "exaggerated" the principles enunciated in
Witters and Zobrest and, therefore, that Aguilar had not been
sufficiently "abandoned" to merit reversal.15 5 According to Souter's
reading of the cases,
[s]ince Aguilar came down, no case has held that there need
be no concern about a risk that publicly paid school teachers
may further religious doctrine; no case has repudiated the
distinction between direct and substantial aid and aid that is
indirect and incidental; no case has held that fusing public
and private faculties in one religious school does not create
an impermissible union or carry an impermissible
endorsement; and no case has held that direct subsidization
of religious education is constitutional or that the
assumption of portion of a religious school's teaching
responsibility is not direct subsidization. 6
Justice Souter's assertions are difficult to contest in the absence of a
theoretical standard for measuring the vulnerability of undermined
precedent. But the economic foundations of this doctrine reveal the
weakness of his position.
Justice Souter did not argue with the proposition that the
Establishment Clause principles that controlled Witters and Zobrest
were different from the standards that controlled Aguilar. The
former found the "neutrality" of the programs at issue sufficient to
sustain them; the latter struck down Title I as "direct aid" to religion
despite its neutrality. It is true, as Justice Souter noted, that since
Aguilar, "no case has held that there need be no concern about a risk
1 57
that publicly paid school teachers may further religious doctrine. 1
But that assertion merely restates the fact that Aguilar had not yet
154. Id. at 254 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
155. Id. at 253 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 253-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 253 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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been overruled. Moreover, that argument misses the point of the
doctrine of undermined authority. The significance of Witters and
Zobrest is not that they expressly repudiated the rule enunciated in
Aguilar. Rather, it is that they established a competing line of
authority that created an uncertain doctrine that rendered efficient
reliance impossible. Indeed, it is precisely because no case had
expressly repudiated Aguilar that reversal of its conflicting rationale
58
might be expected to decrease litigation and adjustment costs.
The economic model makes the stare decisis question in Agostini
an easy one. The Agostini dissenters would have a difficult time
arguing that the degree of decay in Aguilar'srationale was insufficient
to produce the predicted effects on litigation and adjustment costs. In
any event, a debate about those issues would have been much more
satisfying than an interchange about whether the degree of erosion
was "enough" in some abstract, undefined sense.
2. Hubbard v. United States
The Court's decision in Hubbard v. United States 59 also turned
on an application of the notion that undermined authority is
Hubbard overruled United States v.
vulnerable to reversal.
Bramblett,160 which had held that 18 U.S.C. § 1001-a statute that
criminalizes false statements made "in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States, ' 16 - applied to statements made in the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments. The Hubbard Court held that the statute does not
apply to statements made in judicial proceedings. 16 - Although
Hubbard produced three different opinions as to the stare decisis
effects of Bramblett, a majority of the Court essentially agreed with
the basic principle that Bramblett had been sufficiently eroded to

158. Justice Souter's own treatment of the stare decisis question in Agostini reveals the
weakness of his position. Ultimately, Justice Souter conceded that the "cost of
compliance" with the standard set forth in Aguilar is "high," but he insisted that it is worth

the price-that "constitutional lines are the price of constitutional government." Id. at 254
(Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter's argument, in other words, eventually devolves to

the point that Aguilarwas right and that a correct interpretation of the Constitution must
be retained regardless of the price. Although the substantive merits of Aguilar are well
beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that the debate as to the merits of a
precedent is distinct from the debate as to whether it is entitled to deference even if
wrong. Only the latter question is of stare decisis significance.
159. 514 U.S. 695 (1995).
160. 348 U.S. 503 (1955), overruledby Hubbard,514 U.S. at 695.

161. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952) (current version at id. (Supp. IV 1998)).
162. See Hubbard,514 U.S. at 715.
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justify its reversal. 6
Justice Stevens's opinion-a plurality on this issue joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer-noted that the lower courts had
responded to Bramblett by creating a "judicial function exception,"
which gave § 1001 "only a limited application within the Judicial
Branch."'16 Justice Stevens's principal stare decisis argument in favor
of this result was that the judicial function exception was an
"intervening development" in the law, a circumstance long
acknowledged to justify departure from adherence to precedent.1 6
Although the Hubbard Court declined to sanction this exception, its
reversal of Bramblett achieved substantially the same result.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting argument quarreled with
Justice Stevens's characterization of the judicial function exception as
an "intervening development of the law." In the Chief Justice's view,
only changes "in the case law of this Court" qualify as intervening
developments for stare decisis purposes; doctrinal changes in the law
of "the lower federal courts" are irrelevant. 66
The economic model again provides the tools for a concrete
evaluation of the debate between Justice Stevens and Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Hubbard. Instead of an abstract debate about which
developments are sufficiently significant in an undefined sense, the
economic model dictates a discussion about whether overruling
Bramblett would be likely to (1) produce significant adjustment and
litigation costs; and (2) yield substantial error-cost savings. In support
of the majority's position, the argument could be made that reversal
of a decision that already has been substantially eroded in the lower
courts would not give rise to the litigation or adjustment costs usually
associated with reversal. Because the lower courts already limited
§ 1001's application to the judicial branch, a decision reinforcing that
position would enhance consistency and stability in the law.
Consequently, the "reversal" of course in Bramblett avoided the
adjustment and litigation costs that normally would be associated
with its retention. 67
163. See id. at 711-15 (plurality opinion); i at 716-17 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
164. Id. at 713 (plurality opinion).
165. Id. (plurality opinion).
166. Id. at 719 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
167. As Justice Stevens put it, overruling Bramblett "preserve[s] the essence" of the
judicial function exception and "to that extent promote[s] stability in the law." Id. at 713

(plurality opinion). Chief Justice Rehnquist offered an opposing argument that can be
understood to suggest that the majority had overlooked certain other costs of its decision.
Specifically, he argued that treating a lower court's decision that contravened Supreme
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While the usual costs of reversal were minimal, the benefit of
setting aside Bramblett was arguably enhanced. As Justice Scalia
noted in his concurrence, the judicial function exception
"demonstrates how great a potential for mischief federal judges have
discovered in the mistaken reading of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a potential we
did not fully appreciate when Bramblett was decided."'" Specifically,
Justice Scalia expressed the "serious concern that the threat of
criminal prosecution under the capacious provisions of § 1001 will
deter vigorous representation of opposing interests in adversarial
litigation."'69 In economic terms, Justice Scalia might have argued
that Bramblett was not only wrong, but clearly so, and that its error
went beyond the failure to follow the intent of Congress.
3. College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation
Expense Board
The Court's decision in College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaid
PostsecondaryEducation Expense Board7 ° also involved application
of the notion that undermined authority is susceptible to reversal.
College Savings Bank invalidated a provision of the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) that purported to subject states to
liability in suits for false and misleading advertising' 71 on the grounds
that the provision violated the states' sovereign immunity guaranteed
by the Constitution. Specifically, the majority indicated that the
Court's cases had "recognized only two circumstances in which an
individual may sue a State": (1) when Congress has authorized such a
suit "in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment"; and (2) when a state unequivocally has "waive[d] its
sovereign immunity by consenting to suit."'' 7 The Court held that
because neither of these conditions was met, the State of Florida was
constitutionally immune from a suit challenging representations it had
made when it began operating a program that offered certificates of
deposit designed to finance the costs of a college education.173
Court precedent as an intervening development justifying an abandonment of stare decisis
would create an "inducemento" to the lower courts to ignore the Court's precedents. Id.
at 721 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The result, in economic terms, would be increased
adjustment and litigation costs that may be anticipated to flow from the implicit invitation
that accompanied the majority's decision.
168. Id. at 716 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
169. Id. at 717 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

170.
171.
172.
173.

119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2223.
See id. at 2233.
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The majority's recognition of only two inroads on sovereign
immunity foreclosed a third exception that had been recognized in
the Court's earlier decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway of the
Alabama State Docks Department.74 Pardenhad upheld the State of
Alabama's liability under a provision of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act subjecting to suit "every common carrier by railroad ...
engaging in commerce between ...the several States."'75

Parden

turned on Congress's power to "condition[] the right to operate a
railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability to suit in federal
court" and on the fact that Alabama had constructively waived its
sovereign immunity "by thereafter operating a railroad in interstate
commerce.

176

Relying principally on Parden in defending the TRCA, the
petitioner in College Savings Bank argued that if Congress retained
the power to condition the right to "run[] an enterprise for profit ...
in a field traditionally occupied by private persons or corporations
[and] ...sufficiently removed from 'core [state] functions,' "then the

TRCA's attempt to subject states to liability for that type of activity
passed constitutional muster. 7 The petitioner relied on the theory
that a state constructively waives its sovereign immunity by operating
such an enterprise. 78 The Court rejected this argument on the
ground that "the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill
conceived" and was "fundamentally incompatible" with subsequent
sovereign immunity decisions. 7 9 Because the majority saw Parden as
"an anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity," it
"expressly overruled" whatever portions of the case's holding that
might have survived later decisions.8 0
The Court in College Savings Bank split five to four, and the
stare decisis debate was predictably empty. The majority opinion
repeatedly emphasized that Parden was inconsistent with other
decisions (1) "requiring that a State's express waiver of sovereign
immunity be unequivocal"'; (2) repudiating Parden'spremise "that

174. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled in part by College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2219,
and in part by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).

175. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
176. Parden,377 U.S. at 192.
177. College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. at 2228 (quoting Reply Brief for United States at
3, College Savings Bank (No. 98-149)).

178. See id.
179. Id at 2228.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citing Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47,54-55 (1944)).
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state sovereign immunity is not constitutionally grounded"'"; and (3)
precluding Congress from abrogating sovereign immunity even by a
clear statement in a statute enacted pursuant to the commerce
power.t 3
Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority placed special emphasis
on Seminole Tribe's clear statement rule.184 He argued that "[florced
waiver and abrogation are not even different sides of the same cointhey are the same side of the same coin," and that "[t]here is little
more than a verbal distinction between saying that Congress can
make Florida liable to private parties for false or misleading
advertising ...of its prepaid tuition program, and saying the same

thing but adding at the end 'if Florida chooses to engage in such
advertising.' "5 Because Seminole Tribe and other decisions had
weakened Parden,its reversal merely fulfilled the "handwriting on
the wall which even an inept cryptologist would recognize as spelling
out" the Court's decision.'86
Justice Breyer's dissent responded that the precise holding of
Pardenhad been "unanimous[]" and "clear."'187 While conceding that
Seminole Tribe had invalidated "a general congressional 'abrogation'
power, ' 't 88 Justice Breyer argued that Parden rested on a narrower
doctrinal foundation that was necessary to allow Congress to
"effectively ...regulate private conduct" without allowing a gap in

enforcement for states that choose to compete in "ordinary
commercial ventures."'189 Beyond this general assertion, however,
Justice Breyer made little attempt to quarrel with the logic of the
majority's conclusion that Parden had been sufficiently undermined
to justify its reversal. It is difficult to fault him. The current rhetoric
of undermined authority provides no logical basis for a meaningful
debate on this issue.
The economic model provides such a platform. It suggests that
the question whether Pardenhas been sufficiently undermined turns
on whether its reversal is likely to give rise to significant adjustment
and litigation costs. Instead of a shouting match about the degree of
Parden's deterioration, the economic understanding of undermined
182. Id. at 2229 (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,5,-55 (1996)).
183. See id. at 2224 (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73).

184. See supra Part III.B.2.
185. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2229-30.

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 2227 n.2.
dissenting).
Id. at 2234, 2235 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 2235 (Breyer, J.,
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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authority dictates a debate over the adjustment- and litigation-cost
effects of abandoning Parden.
Thus, Justice Scalia might have argued that continued retention
of Parden in the face of inconsistent authority would only enhance
mutual optimism and increase the incentive for litigation. Instead of
increasing litigation costs, rejecting Parden could have the opposite
effect. Indeed, although adopting a new regulatory regime ordinarily
might be expected to give rise to certain start-up interpretation costs,
here following the undermined precedent of Parden already would
produce those costs because it would require courts to draw the line
as to whether a state is competing "in a field traditionally occupied by
private persons or corporations ...in activities sufficiently removed
from 'core [state] functions.' "190
For his part, Justice Breyer might have responded in dissent that
Parden was not so undermined that it could not sustain important
reliance interests. In fact, Justice Breyer might have noted that
Parden is distinguishable in an important sense from the
prototypically undermined decision. Whereas Parden is ideologically
inconsistent with Seminole Tribe and other more recent sovereign
immunity decisions, it conceivably could coexist logically with those
cases. The prototypical undermined decision cannot establish a
predictable foundation for significant reliance because it is always
offset by a competing line of authority. Efficient reliance is
impossible because economic actors face the impossible task of
conforming their conduct to two conflicting lines of authority.
Here, however, Justice Breyer might have argued that Parden's
more specific exception to the general principle announced in
Seminole Tribe could sustain reasonable reliance. Although Seminole
Tribe precludes general congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity and although the logic of Seminole Tribe conflicts with that
which produced Parden, Parden purported to carve out a specific
exception that would allow Congress to condition state participation
in profit-making, non-core state functions on a constructive waiver of
sovereign immunity. Until the specific exception recognized in
Pardenwas overruled, it could-and did-provide the foundation for
structural investment in congressional regulation of such activity. 191
190. Id. at 2228 (quoting Reply Brief for United States at 3, College Savings Bank (No.
98-149)).
191. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994) (subjecting states to federal bankruptcy court
judgments); 15 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994) (subjecting states to suit for violation of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); 17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (1994),
amended by Act of Aug. 5, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-44, § 1(g)(6), 113 Stat. 221, 222 (1999)
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The specific adjustment costs associated with undermining such
reliance are the principal argument in favor of the dissenting view of
the stare decisis question in College Savings Bank. Once again, an
economic foundation provides a meaningful platform for a concrete
debate, even if it falls short of yielding an objectively verifiable

answer.
V. ECONOMICS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY
DICHOTOMY

The Rehnquist Court frequently has suggested that the Court's
constructions of the Constitution deserve a lesser degree of deference
than its interpretations of statutes.' 2
In contrast to other
longstanding strands of the Court's doctrine of precedent, however,
the notion of diminished deference to constitutional precedent is of
relatively recent origin. 93 During the first century and a half of the
Supreme Court's existence, the statutory or constitutional nature of a
decision generally was not deemed relevant to its susceptibility to
reversal.
Indeed, the modem Court's dichotomy between
constitutional and statutory precedent was not an accepted part of the
doctrine of stare decisis until about the 1920s.194
In this Part, I first develop the economic case for the Court's
current approach.
Next, I identify some countervailing cost
considerations that cut in favor of the historical approach.
Ultimately, I conclude that the economic model favors the historical
approach in that the economic arguments in favor of the modem
dichotomy are overbroad.
A. Economics and the Dichotomy in the Modern Court
The modem Court offers two principal justifications for a
diminished standard of deference to constitutional precedent. First,
the Court has suggested that deference to erroneous constitutional
precedent at the expense of the underlying-and controllingdocument would violate the judicial oath to uphold the
Constitution 9 5 Justice Douglas articulated the point as follows: "A
(subjecting states to suit for copyright infringement); 35 U.S.C. §271(h) (1994) (subjecting
states to suit for patent infringement).
192. See Lee, supra note 5, at 703-06.
193. See iLat 708-28.
194. See id.

195. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824-25 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Gathers Court followed Booth v. Maryland,482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987), which held that
the Eighth Amendment bars admission of victim-impact evidence during the penalty

"
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judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to
revere past history and accept what was once written. But he
remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to
support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have
19 6

put on it."'

The Court's second justification emphasizes the unique difficulty
of overturning constitutional decisions outside the judicial process.
Modem decisions often paraphrase Justice Brandeis, "whose
memorable prose [on this point] has since become a mandatory part
of the burial rite for any constitutional precedent"'17:
Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, a universal,
inexorable command.... Stare decisis is usually the wise
policy, because in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.
This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of
serious concern, provided correction can be had by
legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution,
where correction through legislative action is practically
impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier
decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and
the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of
trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is
appropriate also in the judicial function. 8
phase of a capital trial. See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 806-12. The Gathers majority position
was short-lived. Two years later, Justice Souter voted with the Gathers dissenters and the
Court overruled Booth's construction of the Eighth Amendment. See Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 811-30 (1991).
196. Douglas, supra note 1, at 736; see also Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that the only "correct" rule
of decision is "the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it"); Gary Lawson,
The ConstitutionalCase Against Precedent,17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 29-30 (1994)
(arguing that the "judicial power" conferred under Article III includes a "structural
inference" that "the Constitution is supreme ... over all competing sources of law,"
including precedent); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 319 n.349 (1994) ("The Constitution and
federal statutes are written law (not common law); judges are bound by their oaths to
interpret that law as they understand it, not as it has been understood by others.").
197. Lee, supranote 5, at 704.
198. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted), overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain
Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), and in part by Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303
U.S. 362 (1938). The Burnet Court upheld Coronado's exemption from federal income
taxes on the theory that the company was an "instrumentality" of state government
because it produced its oil under a lease of state school lands. See id. at 397-401. The
majority in Burnet found that this conclusion followed necessarily from Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922), and it thus "adhere[d] to the rule there approved."
Burnet, 285 U.S. at 398. For a related argument for the notion of a weak standard of
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The notion of greater respect for statutory decisions depends on
a corollary of this second argument. Because "Congress, not th[e]
Court, has the responsibility for revising its statutes," the Rehnquist
Court has indicated an increased reluctance to overturn statutory

precedent.'99 The Court's interpretation of congressional inaction has
changed over time, varying from the strong position that silence

signifies tacit "approval" of the precedent in question, 2°° to the more
modest notion that inaction "may be probative to varying degrees"
even if it "cannot be regarded as acquiescence under all
circumstances. ' 0 '
Are

arguments

these

in

favor

of

the

modem

constitutional/statutory dichotomy reducible to economic terms?
Perhaps they can be framed in error-cost terms under the social loss
function. The first rationale, which seeks refuge in the "moral high
ground of the judicial oath to uphold the Constitution,' z2 seems
susceptible to a powerful counter-argument:
The judge's oath extends, at least by implication under the
Supremacy Clause, to federal statutes and treaties made
under its provisions. Thus, if the judge's oath implies a duty
to support his own interpretation of the Constitution,
"however different from that put on it by his predecessors,"
the same obligation logically applies to questions of
statutory interpretation. The logical end of the judicial oath
argument, then, is not a reduced standard of deference to
constitutional decisions, but a wholesale abandonment of
stare decisis!

°3

constitutional stare decisis, see New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 590-91 (1946)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (asserting that "it is a wise policy which largely restricts [stare
decisis] to those areas of the law where correction can be had by legislation," since
"[o]therwise the Constitution loses the flexibility necessary if it is to serve the needs of
successive generations").
199. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284,296 (1996). But see State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (noting that "the general presumption that legislative changes should
be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted
view that Congress 'expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by
drawing on common-law tradition.'" (quoting National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978))), overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 146-54
(1968) (holding that vertical maximum price fixing is a per se violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1).
200. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940) (refusing to rescind
the application of the Sherman Act to labor unions because Congress was aware of the
issue and did not legislate).
201. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987).
202. Lee, supra note 5, at 704.
203. Id. at 710-11 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll
(June 25, 1831), reprintedin TiE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL
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Thus, the logical difficulty with the first rationale is that the judge's
oath logically extends with equal force to the Constitution and
statutes alike, and therefore provides no basis for distinguishing
constitutional and statutory precedent.
Perhaps the argument turns on the assumption that the oath to
uphold the Constitution is somehow more important than the oath to
follow statutes. Perhaps Justice Douglas's point depends on a
hypothesis that constitutional errors are more costly than statutory
errors in terms of their magnitude. If constitutional decisions have a
predictably broader impact than their statutory counterparts, then the
social cost of a constitutional error ECc may be more significant than
the social cost of a statutory error EC. If so, a lesser degree of
deference to constitutional decisions could be justified under the
economic model because the condition for reversal of constitutional
precedent [ECC(Y) > AC(X) + LC(X)] would be more likely to be
satisfied than the condition for reversal of statutory precedent
[EC(Y) > AC(X) + LC(X)].
The organic nature of our Constitution may lend support to this
conclusion.
Constitutional decisions frequently "establish [or,
depending on the decision, disestablish] governmental structures";
they are "the framework for all political interactions. 2' 04 Decisions
on such fundamental matters are likely to have widespread effects on
a broad range of individuals and institutions. 2 °5
Consider the Court's decisions as to the scope of governmental
powers-such as the federal government's power under the
Commerce Clause and state governments' powers under the
Commerce Clause's so-called "dormant" counterpart. 26 The Court's
expansive construction of the Commerce Clause provides the
foundation for much of the regulatory infrastructure of the modern
administrative state, as well as for private investment and commercial
THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 390,391

(Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981)).

204. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 431. For reasons noted below, Judge Easterbrook
suggests that the "structural" dimension of constitutional decisions actually undermines
the modem dichotomy. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
205. But see infra Section B.1 (rejecting the unassailability of this conclusion).
206. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
575, 577-78, 580-81 (1997) (discussing the prohibition of the dormant Commerce Clause);
Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1983),
implicitly overruling Public Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83,
84-90 (1927) (holding that the states had power under the dormant Commerce Clause to
regulate retail electric rates but not wholesale rates); see also United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 552-59 (1995) (discussing the history of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
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transactions that are premised on its existence. 2 7 Also significant are
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause decisions, which likewise
sustain state infrastructures that are premised on the existence of
state power within their current domains.0 8

The nature of the error costs associated with such extensive
constitutional precedents will include not only the amorphous failure

to implement the will of the lawmaker as expressed in the underlying
legal text, but also the more concrete expenditure of resources aimed

at extra-judicial correction of such errors. Actual instances of such
extra-judicial correction may be relatively rare,2° 9 but the relevant
"transaction cost" component of error costs must also encompass the
costs of the many failed attempts at correction of Supreme Court
0
decisions through the political process. 21
Such costs are real and
concrete and, arguably, may be more significant when the precedent
is of constitutional dimension.

If constitutional decisions have

broader application than their statutory counterparts, the extent of
and incentive for efforts at extra-judicial correction should be greater
in the constitutional realm, so that ECc > EC s .

Even if the magnitude of constitutional error were rejected as a
basis for a diminished standard of stare decisis, the modem Court's

approach might nevertheless be understood in error-cost terms.
Under the second rationale set forth above, constitutional errors are

deemed more costly than other errors not because of their magnitude,
but because of their longevity. Errors in statutory construction may
be erased even without any action by the Court, because " 'Congress
207. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that "the Court as
an institution and the legal system as a whole have an immense stake in the stability of our
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point").
208. The above analysis may fail to account for certain long-term error costs associated
with an improperly expansive conception of governmental power. An argument could be
made, for example, that the short-term adjustment costs associated with rescinding
governmental regulatory power would be outweighed by the long-term efficiencies flowing
from deregulation.
209. The handful of constitutional amendments overruling specific Supreme Court
precedents include U.S. CONST. amend. XI (restricting the application of Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), to forbid certain suits against states in federal court);
id. amend. XIV, § 1 (abrogating Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399-454 (1857),
which held that freedmen were not citizens of the United States and therefore lacked the
right to sue in federal courts); id. amend. XVI (abrogating Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 553-86 (1895), which held invalid the unapportioned federal
income tax); id. amend. XXVI (abrogating Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970),
which held that Congress could not set the minimum voting age in state elections).
210. For a discussion of several such amendments, see Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra
note 39, 152-61 (offering a public-choice analysis of the failed "child labor amendment,"
the "equal rights amendment," the "term limits amendment," and others).
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is free to change th[e] Court's interpretation of its legislation.' ,,211
But constitutional errors are much less likely ever to be corrected
without some intervention by the Court because "[r]evision of a
constitutional interpretation ... requires the cumbersome route of

constitutional amendment," and this process is thought to be nearly
"impossible as a practical matter. '212 If error costs associated with
constitutional decisions are more likely to persist without external
correction, a diminished standard of deference might be appropriate
because expected ECC may be greater than expected EC5 over time.
The comparative ease of extra-judicial reversal of statutory
precedent may also affect the error-cost element in another way.
Until now, the analysis has proceeded on the assumption that the
current Court's perception of error is itself accurate and certain. In
other words, the assumption is that the Court operates with perfect
certainty and accuracy when it determines that an earlier decision is
in error. In reality, of course, the Court likely will proceed in the face
of some degree of uncertainty as to whether or not an earlier decision
truly fails to implement the intent of the governing text, whether
constitutional or statutory. If so, the relative ease of congressional
reversal of statutory precedent, as compared to the difficulty of
amending the Constitution, may suggest a relevant difference in the
Court's level of certainty as to the likelihood of an error.
In statutory cases, the Court has suggested that congressional
failure to reverse an arguably erroneous precedent gives rise to an
inference. The nature of that inference may range from one of tacit
congressional approval213 to the notion that silence "may be probative
to varying degrees" even if it is not the equivalent of "acquiescence
under all circumstances. 21 4 Setting aside the difficult questions of
whether such an inference reasonably reflects current political reality
and whether it undermines constitutional prerequisites to
211. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,736 (1977)). The Neal Court refused to overrule Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 455-68 (1991), which held that a sentencing court is required by
statute to take into account the weight of "blotter paper" with its absorbed LSD in
determining whether the weight of the LSD justifies a mandatory minimum sentence. See
Neal, 516 U.S. at 295-96.
212. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
(refusing to overrule precedent that had rejected a Due Process Clause challenge to a state
procedure allowing the sequestration of property without prior notice or opportunity for a
hearing pending a hearing on the merits of the seller's claim that the buyer had defaulted).
213. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940) (refusing to rescind
the application of the Sherman Act to labor unions because Congress was aware of the
issue and did not legislate); supra note 200 and accompanying text.
214. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616,629 n.7 (1987).
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congressional lawmaking, this inference suggests that the Court's
confidence in the accuracy of its statutory precedents should increase
over time. If Congress's failure to take action to correct the Court's
construction of a statute has some degree of probity as to
congressional "acquiescence" to the decision in question, the Court
should have greater confidence in the accuracy of its statutory
precedents than it would in its constitutional decisions, because the
mechanism for reversal of constitutional decisions is much more
cumbersome and difficult to implement. Indeed, if the Court's
comparatively greater confidence in its statutory decisions translates
into fewer errors in the statutory realm, then there may be a further
error-cost justification for the modem treatment of statutory
precedent.
B. Economics and the HistoricalApproach to Constitutionaland
Statutory Precedent
Having made the economic case for the modem Court's
approach to constitutional precedent, I now evaluate whether
countervailing economic considerations may justify the historical
rejection of that approach. If error-cost considerations tend to justify
the modem notion of diminished constitutional precedent, how can
we explain the historical rejection of that approach?
1. Constitutional and Statutory Error Costs
The error-cost premises that underlie the Court's
statutory/constitutional dichotomy are vulnerable for several reasons.
First, the notion that constitutional errors are more significant in their
magnitude may be true in many cases, but it is not necessarily so.
Like many constitutional precedents, some statutory decisions may
have broad-ranging effects on a wide array of governmental and
private institutions. Examples include decisions construing the
preemptive effect of congressional statutes215 or determining the
content and application of regulatory machinery in statutes like the
215. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 221-35 (1995) (holding
that a section of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988)
(current version at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994)), preempted state law claims brought
under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 505/1-505/12 (West 1999)); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 223 (1983) (holding that the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976) (current version at id- §§ 2011-2297g-4 (1994
& Supp. III 1997)), did not preempt California regulation of the construction of nuclear
power plants).
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Voting Rights Act, 16 Title IX,21 7 or even the Americans with
Disabilities Act 1
Such precedents turn entirely on matters of
statutory construction, but have the potential to authorize a wide
range of governmental regulation, enforcement, and investment.
Thus, they are likely to have broad application to both governmental
institutions and individuals alike.
Conversely, some constitutional decisions will have only narrow
application and thus cannot be thought to give rise to broad-ranging
error costs in the sense noted above 1 9 For example, when the Court
rules on the constitutionality of introducing victim-impact evidence in
capital trials,z 0 or of screening a child witnesses from the view of a
defendant charged with child sex abuse z2 1 it affects criminal
defendants in certain kinds of cases, but it does not establish
precedent on which underlying bureaucracies are structured.
Because there is no necessary connection between the
constitutional character of a decision and its breadth of application,
the modem rule that constitutional precedent is of lesser value than
statutory precedent is difficult to justify on the basis of the expected
magnitude of constitutional errors. Direct consideration of the
relative breadth of a particular precedent may be economically
justifiable, but the constitutional or statutory dimension of the
decision is an imperfect proxy for such a considerationm
The notion that constitutional errors are more persistent than
statutory errors is vulnerable on similar grounds. Several critics of
the modem approach have noted that its primary rationale proves too
much.
Although some, or perhaps even much, constitutional
precedent is not susceptible to statutory reversal, the point is not
applicable across the board. Specifically, the Court's "nonactivist
decisions"-those declining to extend individual constitutional
rights-are in some sense subject to "correction" by the legislative
process.' So long as Congress acts pursuant to a constitutional grant

216. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994).
217. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
218. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. 111997).
219. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
220. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 811-30 (1991).
221. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1014-22 (1988).
222. Moreover, the conclusion that a particular precedent has broad application may
suggest other, countervailing cost considerations that may militate in favor of greater
deference. Specifically, a decision to overrule a broadly applicable precedent may give
rise to significantly greater adjustment costs than those decisions associated with
abandoning a more narrow precedent.
223. Maltz, supra note 33, at 471.
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of power, subsequently enacted statutes may effectively overrule "the
results (if not the decisions)" of precedents that reject "autonomy or
equality claims." 4
At a minimum, this analysis suggests that the modem notion of a

diminished standard of deference to constitutional precedent is
overbroad.

To put the point in economic terms, even if the

constitutional nature of a precedent is generally an accurate proxy for
More
relatively high error costs, the proxy is imperfect.
fundamentally, the notion of a relatively large and persistent ECc

over time seems to disregard the purpose and structure of the
amendment procedures in the Constitution itself. As Judge
Easterbrook has noted, Article V of the Constitution intentionally
establishes a "hard" amendment process, and the "[r]eady overruling
of constitutional cases interferes with" the twin objectives of that
process: ensuring the stability of governmental institutions and
assuring super-majoritarian support for any constitutional standard.M
224. Monaghan, supra note 3, at 742. But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
534-35 (1997) (declaring unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)); id. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that stare decisis should be particularly weak in constitutional cases, since, "as this case so
plainly illustrates---' " 'correction through legislative action is practically impossible' "'."
in such cases (quoting Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (quoting Payne,
501 U.S. at 828 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas. Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting))))); Paulsen, supra note 128 (manuscript at 166 n.168) (asserting
that "[b]ehind the (weak) reasoning of City of Boerne lies thinly-veiled judicial hostility to
Congress asserting any role as interpreter and enforcer of the Bill of Rights, if that role
involves Congress's assertion that the Court has misinterpreted the Constitution in an
important way," and that the decision "may be taken as a judicial supremacist statement
that Congress may not pass an otherwise constitutional statute if it insults the Court's
sense of its own dignity and supremacy").
225. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 430-31 (arguing that a relaxed stare decisis standard
not only reduces the "stability of governmental institutions," but also, in constitutional
cases, "saps the drive for change in the constitutional text," thereby undermining the
requirement of super-majoritarian approval of constitutional rules); see also Lee, supra
note 5, at 703-08 (discussing the possible justifications for the Court's "diminished
standard of deference to constitutional decisions"). For discussion of the notion that
constitutional rights are intentionally more durable than their statutory counterparts, see
Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 39, at 117 (concluding that not all interest groups seek
"constitutional protections for their desired privileges" because "constitutional provisions
cost more" than their statutory counterparts and indicating that the difference is "by
design"); W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, Constitutional Change in an InterestGroup Perspective, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 168-70 (1979) (" '[A] constitutional provision
confers more durable protection than is possible by ordinary legislative action.'" (quoting
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 892 (1975))); Dennis C. Mueller, ConstitutionalRights, 7
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 329 (1991) ("A right created by a simple majority vote in the
postconstitutional stage is less secure than one protected by the constitution, since it can
be taken away by a majority vote.").
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In economic terms, this point may be reduced to the assertion
that ECC is actually less than EC . The argument turns on the notion
that although a decision to overturn a purportedly erroneous
constitutional precedent arguably saves the specific error cost
associated with that precedent, it also gives rise to a general error cost
of a different sort. To see why, recall that EC is defined as a failure
by the Court to implement the intent of the governing statute or
constitutional provision. On constitutional issues, Article V evinces a
general intent to make cumbersome the process of doctrinal
change z 6 Thus, a doctrine that opens the door to relatively
unfettered reversal of constitutional precedents on the sole basis that
they are perceived to be in error introduces a general error in the
form of a collision with the principles of Article V that may well
counter-balance the specific error costs associated with any particular
precedent.
A related point hearkens back to the uncertainty discussion
detailed above.227 If the decision whether to reverse any particular
precedent is understood to turn in part on the Court's degree of
confidence that the precedent is in fact in error, Article V suggests
that the "standard of proof" ought to be higher in constitutional cases
than in statutory ones. Article V, in other words, suggests that the
design of the Constitution is to entrench constitutional principles until
altered by the super-majoritarian processes it prescribes.
Consequently, a higher tolerance for supposed errors in constitutional
precedent is more consistent with this design.
Finally, ECf may be less than EC' from the standpoint of the
transaction-cost component of error costs. This assertion may seem
contrary to the above suggestion that Article V dictates a difficult and
costly process for any particular attempt at extra-judicial correction of
constitutional precedent. But if Article V's costly procedures serve as
a barrier to the amendment process, then expected total expenditures
on extra-judicial correction may be lower for constitutional precedent
than for statutory precedent. In other words, even if the cost of any
particular attempt at extra-judicial correction is predictably higher for
a constitutional precedent, the expected transaction cost component
of the EC' variable would be lower because fewer constitutional
decisions would be challenged outside the judicial process.?
226. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 430.
227. See supraPart II.

228. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSupreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101

YALE

LJ. 331, 335-36 (1991) (criticizing prior empirical studies that

reinforced the mistaken assumption of congressional apathy toward the Court's statutory
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2. Constitutional and Statutory Adjustment Costs
The economic justification for the modem rule of diminished
deference to constitutional precedent is also suspect in its myopic
focus on the error-cost element of the loss function. Even assuming

for the sake of argument that ECc > EC s , that assumption alone does

not necessarily sustain the conclusion that the modem rule is
economically optimal.

Other cost factors may cut in the opposite

direction and favor a rule of enhanced deference to constitutional
precedent. Specifically, even if ECc > ECs , the condition for
abandoning precedent [EC(Y) > AC(X) + LC(X)] may not be more
likely to be satisfied for constitutional precedent if AC c > AC5.
On one hand, it seems difficult to generalize about the
comparative adjustment-cost effects of constitutional and statutory
precedent. If the assertion that constitutional precedents generate
more significant error costs than statutory decisions is overbroad, the
same criticism would apply to a conclusion that reversal of
constitutional decisions will engender more substantial adjustment
costs.
On the other hand, the logic of the error-cost argument in
support of a standard of diminished deference to constitutional
authority suggests that any expected error-cost savings generally may
be offset by corresponding adjustment costs. Recall that the errorcost argument stems from the assertion that constitutional precedents
are generally organic in nature and have broader application than
their statutory counterparts
Even if we ignore the over- and
under-inclusiveness of this argument, it fails to acknowledge the fact
that the same breadth of application would tend to generate
significant error-cost savings and would also give rise to significant
adjustment costs. Thus, when constitutional decisions establish the
framework for other laws and governmental institutions, reversal of
such decisions would give rise to substantial adjustment costs as
public and private actors are forced to restructure the laws and
institutions that are built around the abandoned regime.
In terms of the model, the cases where ECc > ECs should be the
same cases where ACc > AC. If so, the condition for abandoning
precedent [EC(Y) > AC(X) + LC(X)] may not be more likely to be
satisfied for constitutional precedent because any enhanced error-cost
savings will be offset by increased adjustment costs. Consider again
.l

decisions and asserting that his research revealed that Congress closely monitors the
Court's statutory decisions).
229. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
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the Commerce Clause example. 0 Although precedents establishing
the basis for federal regulation under the Commerce Clause or state
regulation under its dormant counterpart may give rise to substantial
error costs when they are erroneous, a decision to overturn them
likewise would be costly from an adjustment cost perspective. Thus,

although the Court was willing to breathe some new life into the
Commerce Clause's restriction on federal legislative power in United
States v. Lopez,'

1

at least two Justices suggested that the reliance

interests advanced by the doctrine of stare decisis prevented them
from going further and unraveling the bulk of the Court's expansive
Commerce Clause precedents. 2
Structural adjustment costs are not confined to cases expressly
defining the scope of governmental power. Similar, albeit narrower,
adjustment costs would flow from any decision that indirectly restricts
the scope of state powers acknowledged under current case law, for
example, by overruling a decision that a certain provision of the Bill
of Rights is not incorporated against the states' 3 or by adopting a
more expansive conception of an individual constitutional right.23
Accordingly, any decision implicitly authorizing governmental action
by rejecting an argument for recognition of an individual
constitutional right provides the basis for structural reliance. 5
230. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
231. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
232. See id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that stare decisis serves to
caution the Court against questioning settled principles regarding Congress's power to
regulate commercial transactions); see also iL at 601 & n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting that although the Court's Commerce Clause decisions since the 1930s are
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Clause, "[c]onsideration of stare decisis and
reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean").
233. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969) (making the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states), overruling Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
234. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 431 & n.27 (raising dormant Commerce Clause
and incorporation cases as prototypical examples of decisions that have "widespread
effects on planning").
235. As Judge Easterbrook has noted, even constitutional decisions that do not have
"structural effects" on government institutions may nevertheless have "widespread effects
on planning." Id. at 431. Judge Easterbrook offers Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), as an example, and argues that it is a
structural decision on which other doctrines and institutions depend. For
example, to the extent Miranda makes it harder to obtain convictions, courts
respond by increasing the sentences of those who are convicted, so as to keep
general deterrence constant. The higher sentence levels are built into the
guidelines that control sentencing in federal courts, and into the penalty
structures of state law. One could not change Mirandawithout being prepared to
rethink criminal sentences. So too with civil liability. We can contemplate "good
faith immunity" for the police with more equanimity, given Miranda and the
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Rejection of a commercial speech claim, for example, invites
institutional reliance in the form of enforcement mechanisms aimed
at the commercial activity in question. Consider the Court's attorneyadvertising jurisprudence, which substantially limits the permissible
scope of attorney-advertising regulations, but specifically upholds
state bar associations' power to regulate in-person solicitation of
cients 2 6 and to prohibit direct mail solicitation of victims during the
first thirty days after an accidentI 37 State bar associations have
adopted regulations and enforcement mechanisms that presuppose
the validity of these precedents?3 8 Any decision to overturn them
would undercut these regulatory frameworks and enforcement
mechanisms and produce significant structural adjustment costs.
Again, a point of caution is in order: just as the constitutional
dimension of a decision is an imperfect proxy for error costs,1 9 it also

fails as a proxy for high adjustment costs. Although a decision
restricting the reach of the federal government's authority under the
Commerce Clause or the states' authority under its dormant
counterpart would undermine institutional and structural investment
built around the earlier, more expansive regime, the same would not
necessarily hold when the Court moves in the opposite direction. A
decision expanding governmental authority would not be expected to
undercut structural reliance interests to any significant degree.
C. Applying the Model
The net effect of the above discussion is that the economic model
does not sustain a diminished standard of deference to constitutional
precedent in all cases. Erroneous constitutional precedents may
sustain more significant and more durable error costs than their
statutory counterparts. Then again, they may not. Indeed, even in
cases where ECc > EC, error-cost savings associated with reversal
may be offset by predictably higher adjustment costs. Thus, while the
economic model can be manipulated to justify a general depreciation
of the precedential weight of constitutional decisions, a more
comprehensive understanding of the competing economic factors at
pressure it places on police to behave, than we could if only the pre-Miranda
voluntariness doctrines governed interrogations.
Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 431-32.
236. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,468 (1978).
237. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,635 (1995).
238. See, e.g., ALABAMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 7.3 (1996);
CoLoRADo RULES OF PROFEssIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 7.3 (1999).
239. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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stake seems to reject this approach.
As I have noted elsewhere, the current Court's notion of a
diminished standard of deference to constitutional authority
represents a rhetorical departure from earlier doctrine. 240 But
although the Rehnquist Court now seems settled on this rhetorical
device, the results of the Court's decisions may be explained under a
straightforward application of other strands of the doctrine. The
Rehnquist Court's practice to date suggests that the constitutional
dimension of a decision has been insufficient by itself to justify its
reversal.241 A number of the Court's recent constitutional overrulings
easily could be justified under the notion that "rules of procedure"
are of diminished precedential value,242 while others might be
explained under the principle that accords reduced deference to
undermined authority.2 43 In each instance, the Court easily could
have abandoned earlier constitutional authority under doctrinal
240. See Lee, supra note 5, at 712-30.
241. See id. at 729-30.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995), overruling Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929). Gaudin held that "materiality" was a factual matter
for the jury to decide and not a matter of law for the court to resolve. See Gaudin, 515
U.S. at 521. The Court also noted that Sinclair's precedential value was minimal because
it established a "procedural rule ... which d[id] not serve as a guide to lawful behavior."
Id. In Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995), the Court overruled
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), and held that all race-based
governmental classifications must be analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard. See
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-31. In language similar to that of the Gaudin Court, the
AdarandCourt noted "that reliance on a case that has recently departed from precedent is
likely to be minimal, particularly where, as here, the rule set forth in that case [Metro
Broadcasting]is unlikely to affect primary conduct in any event." Id. at 234. Likewise,
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), suggested that the Court's prior decisions
precluding victim-impact evidence in capital cases under the Eighth Amendment were
ripe for rejection because cases "involving procedural and evidentiary rules" do not
sustain significant reliance interests. ld. at 828.
243. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1997) (suggesting that the
Establishment Clause decisions precluding federal funding of programs on parochial
school premises were subject to reversal because there had been a "significant change in,
or subsequent development of, our constitutional law"); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (noting that Union Gas was "a solitary departure from established law"
and was of "questionable precedential value, largely because a majority of the [Union
Gas] Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality"), overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (upholding Congress's power to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity by unequivocally expressing its intent
to do so); Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521 (noting that Sinclair's "underpinnings" had been
"eroded ... by subsequent decisions of this Court"), overruling Sinclair,279 U.S. at 263;
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704, 709-10 (1993) (asserting that Grady v. Corbin,
495 U.S. 508 (1990), was "wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent" and
that Grady's foundations were undermined by United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992),
which "recognize[d] a large exception" that "avoid[ed] a 'literal' (i.e., faithful) reading of
Grady"), overrulingGrady, 495 U.S. at 508.

200]

STARE DECISIS

strands that find sound theoretical support under the economic
model.
CONCLUSION
few decades, 2 "

For at least the past
academic commentary has
almost universally condemned the Supreme Court's doctrine of
precedent as incoherent and disingenuous. 45 In some cases, the
cynical view is undoubtedly accurate; not every application of the
Court's principles of stare decisis can be championed as a triumph of
reason.
But if the Court's doctrine of stare decisis largely "has been with
us since the founding era,"'246 then perhaps it deserves a chance to be
taken seriously. This Article does so by theorizing that principles of
stare decisis are designed to minimize a social loss function consisting
of the principal costs at stake in any given decision as to whether to
abandon a prior precedent. Under the economic model developed
here, the Court's equivocation as to whether error is a sufficient basis
for reversal can be understood to dictate a case-by-case inquiry into
the relative magnitude of competing considerations of adjustment and
litigation costs on the one hand, and error costs on the other. Other
strands of the Court's doctrine can be understood as particularized
applications of this same approach.
Admittedly, the economic model falls short of providing
objective, universal answers to the questions of whether and when a
precedent deemed in error may be set aside. That criticism, however,
should be neither surprising nor fatal to the model's utility.
Economic analysis allows the stare decisis debate to move from
vacuous ipse dixit to an analysis of the concrete cost considerations
that underlie the various strands of the Court's doctrine of precedent.
Thus, instead of unanswerable assertions about whether a precedent
has been sufficiently weakened by complaints from lower-court
judges about its unworkability, or by subsequent Supreme Court
decisions that undermine its theoretical foundations, the model
dictates a debate over a precedent's effects on litigation expenses,
adjustment costs, and error costs. Identification of the concrete cost
considerations that underlie the doctrines of unworkability and
244. As I have noted elsewhere, the cynical view is not unique to the modem era. See
Lee, supra note 5, at 734 n.459 (citing DANIEL CHAmBERLAIN, THE DOcTRINE OF
STARE DECIsIS: ITS REASONS AND ITS EXTENT 26 (1885); EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE
STUDY OF CASES § 95, at 106-07 (1894)).
245. See supranotes 2-6 and accompanying text.
246. Lee, supra note 5, at 651.
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undermined authority may not yield an objectively verifiable answer,
but it does facilitate a debate that extends beyond the empty rhetoric
that now dominates the Court's treatment of these issues.

